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INTRODUCTION
In tax we love rules. By and large, those of us who live in the tax
world are old-fashioned formalists who believe in the value of rules
and who believe that rules work.' This Article considers whether in
tax our passion for rules has led us astray by causing us to adopt rules
that are overly elaborate, detailed, and specific. In addressing this
question, this Article proceeds from the assumption that the proliferation of elaborate rules in federal tax law has reached a point of
extremely burdensome complexity. No extensive effort is made here
to prove this truth, and hopefully the reader requires none. Instead
the focus here is upon a pair of crucial justifications-fairness and certainty-for the elaborate nature of tax rules.
This Article addresses the appropriateness of elaborate tax rules,
that is, rules that are long, detailed, specific, and interconnected, by
reference to the debate among jurisprudential scholars concerning the
determinacy of law. It gives special attention to the works of Professors Anthony D'Amato,2 Kent Greenawalt,3 Ken Kress,4 and Frederick Schauer 5 by placing their ideas concerning legal indeterminacy
1. "At the heart of the word 'formalism,' in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept of
decisionmaking according to rule." Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510
(1988).
2. In particular, I will use Anthony D'Amato's article entitled PragmaticIndeterminacy, 85
Nw. U. L. REV. 148 (1990).
3. Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1990). More
recently, Professor Greenawalt has published a book where he sets out at greater length his views
on the indeterminacy question. KENT GREENAVALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY (1992).
4. In particular, I will draw upon Ken Kress' article entitled Legal Indeterminacy,77 CAL. L.
REV. 283 (1989).
5. Particular attention will be paid to Frederick Schauer's article entitled Formalism, supra
note 1. More recently, Professor Schauer has written a book bearing on the topic of legal
indeterminacy. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULaS: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991)

Justifying Simplification in Tax Law
into the context of tax law. Professor D'Amato asserts that law is
entirely indeterminate. 6 Professor Greenawalt believes that "many
legal questions have determinate answers." 7 Professor Kress believes
that "the indeterminacy of the law is no more than moderate." 8 Professor Schauer argues that highly determinate rule systems are
possible.9
The debate over law's determinacy has been characterized as the
central issue in modem legal scholarship. 10 Whether or not this is so,
this debate sheds light on the relationship between rules and fairness.11
Among other things, the indeterminacy debate demonstrates that in
an important sense the proper role of rules in our tax system is a question of philosophy rather than of tax theory. The vast proliferation of
rules in the law of federal taxation rests upon the belief that elaborate
rules can render tax law both fair and certain. The unspoken assumptions are that rules determine outcomes in a mechanical fashion and
that fairness can be produced by such a process. The indeterminacy
debate offers insights about how rules work that may cause us to
rethink our views of the value of elaborate rules to achieve fairness.
Recently there have been some signs that the tide is beginning to
turn against the use of elaborately detailed and specific rules in the
area of tax law. Former Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Fred
T. Goldberg, Jr., who was confirmed for the post of Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy in early 1992, has a long record of supporting various forms of simplification. 2 He has declared that simplification is
6. D'Amato, supra note 2, at 170.
7. Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 86. Elsewhere in the same article he states his thesis as:
"many legal questions have determinate answers that 1) would be arrived at by virtually all those
with an understanding of the legal system and 2) are unopposed by powerful arguments,
consonant with the premises of the system, for contrary results." Id. at 29.
8. Kress, supra note 4, at 283.
9. Schauer, supra note 1, at 520-38.
10. D'Amato, supra note 2, at 148.
11. This reason for considering law's determinacy is rather different from those more
commonly offered for considering the question. For example, one reason proffered in other
contexts for considering law's determinacy derives from the argument that the "legitimacy" of
legal decisions depends upon judges applying the law rather than making the law. See Kress,
supra note 4, at 285. If a decision makes law rather than applies it, it can derive no moral
authority from the law itself. See id. at 287. Kress is critical of the view that adjudications
derive their legitimacy from the legitimacy of legislative rules. Id. at 288-89. He contends that
whether one has an obligation to obey the law is not directly tied to whether law is determinate.
Id. at 290. Like Kress, Greenawalt is also critical of the idea that the legitimacy of courts
depends on determinacy. He points out that somebody must resolve legal disputes even if law is
indeterminate and suggests that the courts are better suited for this task than any other organ of
government. Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 37-38.
12. See Rita Zeidner, Goldberg Confirmedfor Treasury Tax Policy Post, 54 TAx NoTES 505
(1992) ("Goldberg promised to maintain his commitment to tax simplification while at Treasury.
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"the most important tax policy issue of the 1990s. ' 113 There is some
evidence that under his direction a real effort is being made to turn
away from detailed rules.14 It is too early to say if these signs represent a long term trend toward more general rules or merely a momentary pause in the rush toward technical gridlock. There are, after all,
tremendous forces at work in our society that foster the promulgation
of detailed and elaborate rules in our tax system. 5 This Article is
intended to bolster the trend toward general rules.
Part I of this Article begins setting the stage for a discussion of the
determinacy or indeterminacy of tax rules by describing our tax system's reliance upon elaborate rules to achieve fairness and by acknowledging the implicit assumption of law's determinazy that underlies
that reliance upon elaborate rules. Part II of this Article is devoted to
refining our understanding of what is meant by the term "legal indeterminacy" and by considering the varying aspects of tax complexity.
Part III examines the moral structure of tax law as seen through the
eyes of tax professionals (especially those who write statutes and regulations). The purpose of this part is to describe two different
approaches to rule making and to provide an understanding of the
beliefs that foster those different approaches. Part IV addresses the
question of whether (and to what extent) tax law is indeterminate. It
does this by reference to various attacks upon and defenses of law's
determinacy that have been offered in other contexts. Because I conclude that tax determinacy is a reality, this part of the Article also
considers how rules are determinate. Part V offers some general conclusions concerning the proper role of rules in achieving acceptable
and administrable levels of fairness and certainty in tax law.
'We're killing people out there,' he said. 'We have got to make [simplification] a priority.' ")
(brackets in original); see also Brian R. Brown, PractitionersHighlight Problems with AMT Book
Income Regulations, 36 TAX NOTES 937, 939 (1987); Sean Ford, The Week in Review, 44 TAX
NOTES 1302 (1989); Tim Gray, W & M PanelNot Enthusiasticover Service's Taxpayer's Rights
Proposals,52 TAX NOTES 1558 (1991); Rita Zeidner & Catharine Hubbard, Let Your Microchips
Do It: Service Reviews Computer Agenda, 53 TAX NOTES 638 (1991); Rita Zeidner, Goldberg
Condemns Strong-Arm Tactics, 53 TAX NOTES 773 (1991).
13. Bennett Minton, Goldberg Urges Compromise on Simplification, 53 TAX NOTES 148
(1991).
14. See Joanna Richardson et al., New Passive Loss 'Activity' Regs Get Good Reviews, 55 TAX
NOTES 1024 (1992); see also part II.C. In a recent memorandum to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) personnel responsible for regulation drafting, Secretary Goldberg wrote: "General
principles are often better than detailed rules. All too often, detailed rules result in the worst of
both worlds-they suffocate the many taxpayers who try to do what's right, while providing a
road map for the few with larceny in their hearts." Memorandum from Fred Goldberg et al. to
All Employees of the Office of Chief Counsel, All Employees of the Office of Tax Policy, and All
Assistants to the Commissioner (May 1, 1992) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
15. See part I.

Justifying Simplification in Tax Law
Three themes arise from the various matters considered in this Article. First, to the extent any rule is determinate, that determinacy
arises from the way in which the rule restricts our ability to make
choices, including fair choices, in individual cases. Put differently,
"rules achieve their 'ruleness' precisely by . ..screening off from a
decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise
take into account." 16 This means that the aspect of law that renders it
certain is also potentially a bar to individual justice. For this reason,
the simultaneous effort to achieve both fairness and certainty through
great elaboration of the rules of taxation is inherently contradictory
and yields a never ending spiral of complexity. This does not mean,
however, that relatively determinate law cannot be fair, but that fairness cannot be achieved mechanically through the use of unbending
rules. Instead, fair rules often must leave some room for human judgment in their application. A second theme developed by this Article is
that elaborative complexity contributes to the practical indeterminacy
of tax law by rendering the law beyond the ken of those persons who
are supposed to apply it. As a consequence, even theoretically sound
and determinate rules lose their vitality in our present "serbonian
bog"'" of rules. A final theme of this Article is that tax law is a system
of rules that depends on constant and creative adaptation to meet
changing circumstances. As such we should give emphasis to the tax
system's flexibility as well as to its completeness. Taken together,
these themes argue for an approach toward tax rule making that is less
concerned with details and more concerned with establishing fair general principles.
I.

DRAWING SOME CONNECTIONS BETWEEN TAX
COMPLEXITY, FAIRNESS AND THE ASSUMPTION
OF LAW'S DETERMINACY

United States tax law is one of the most complicated bodies of law
to be found in this country, and, perhaps, in any country. 18 There is
much discussion concerning the need for simplification of tax law,
16. Schauer, supra note 1, at 510.
17. See Charles S.Whitman, III, Drainingthe SerbonianBog: A New Approach to Corporate
Separations Under the 1954 Code, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1194 (1968) (Whitman's concern was the
confusing morass of rules embedded in and around code section 355). The serbonian bog was a
marshy area in northern Egypt which during ancient times was reputed to have swallowed whole
armies.
18. Professor Richard Doerberg has made a similar claim concerning complexity and the
federal income tax. He asserts that the U.S. has "the most complex income tax laws in the
history of civilization." Richard L. Doernberg, The Market for Tax Reform: Public Painfor
Private Gain, 41 TAx NoTEs 965 (1988).
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though some commentators question whether simplification is practical.1 9 Complexity is sometimes justified on the grounds that simplifi-

cation will reduce fairness.20

This principle

may be stated

affirmatively as holding that tax complexity is a necessary byproduct
of fairly addressing the full sweep of tax questions arising in today's
complex world.2 1 For example, the nondiscrimination rules applicable
19. See Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grailof Tax Simplification, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1267,
1268 (citing further authorities on this issue); see also The Tax Analysts Roundtable on Tax
Simplification, 53 TAX NoTEs 969 (1991). The article is followed by a bibliography of Tax Notes
articles on tax simplification issues. Id. at 981. The Tax Law Review recently devoted an entire
issue to the problem. See 45 TAX L. REV. 1 (1989); see also Gordon D. Henderson, Controlling
Hyperlexis-The Most Important "Law and. . . '"43 TAX LAW. 177 (1989).
20. See McCaffery, supra note 19, at 1279-91 (McCaffery does not endorse this view himself
but provides a useful catalogue of some who do.). One might expect this view to be particularly
favored by tax administrators because it is their regulations that stand out as generating the most
complexity. IRS Chief Counsel Nelson was reported to have taken the position that the goals of
simplicity and fairness often conflict. See Commissioner's Advisory Group's June Meeting
Minutes Discuss Penalties,Recruiting and Tax Administration, 41 TAX NOTES 167 (1988). At a
time when he served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, Stanley Surrey wrote,
"Equity calls for looking at all the circumstances that might bear on the ,airness of the amount of
tax, while the essence of simplicity is to ignore some facts." Stanley S.Surrey & Gerard M.
Brannon, Simplification and Equity as Goals of Tax Policy, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV.915, 916
(1968). But the belief that simplicity and fairness are antithetical is not confined to those in
government. Professor Karla Simon recently wrote, "it has become generally accepted that the
goals of fairness, simplicity, and efficiency frequently may conflict, wkich results in a need to
choose among unpopular alternatives." Karla W. Simon, Tax Simplification and Justice, 36 TAX
NoTES 93 (1987). Some academics are apt to be more circumspect in their pronouncements
concerning the connection between fairness and complexity, but, even so, one often encounters
the implication that complexity is an unavoidable aspect of good law. "Our complex world
creates complex transactions which create complex tax issues which lead to complex statutes."
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical
Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 475 (1987). "The failure to achieve increased simplicity
[in the 1986 Act] results from at least two factors. First, simplicity frequently competes with the
other two objectives of fairness and efficiency." Pamela B. Gann, What Has Happened to the Tax
Legislative Process?, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1196, 1206 (1988). "[S]ome business activities are
inherently complex and proper taxation of those activities may require similarly complex statutes
...." Michael B. Lang, Dividends Essentially Equivalent to Redemptions: The Taxation of
Bootstrap Stock Acquisitions, 41 TAX L. REV. 309, 355 (1986). The difficulty of establishing a
true measure of income is often cited as a reason for complexity. Recently, for example,
Professor Joseph Isenbergh wrote, "[t]he closer an income tax comes to reaching economic
income, the more complex it must be." Joseph Isenbergh, The End of Income Taxation, 45 TAX
L. REV. 283, 315 (1990). In a similar vein, Professor Victor Thuronyi suggests that "[p]art of the
reason for the complexity of the Code is that complex business and finar.cial transactions require
complicated tax rules if income is to be measured accurately." Victor Thuronyi, Tax Reform for
1989 andBeyond, 42 TAX NoTEs 981, 982 (1989). One view even goes so far as to suggest that
complexity has an in terrorem effect that may enhance overall fairness. See Charles Davenport,
Are PALs Our Friends?AALS ConfereesDissect Passive Activity Regulations, 46 TAX NOTES 256,
257 (1990).
21. A prominent supporter of this view was Stanley S. Surrey. See Stanley S. Surrey,
Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 697-702 (1969).

Justifying Simplification in Tax Law
to private retirement plans were originally enacted "in an attempt to
prevent pension plans' abusive targeting of benefits for top management at the expense of lower-paid employees." 2 2 This was the beginning of "a long march to complexity" in the private pension field.2 3
It is not clear that all those persons who believe that fair tax laws
are necessarily complex, also believe that this complexity should be
made manifest by promulgation of elaborate rules. After all, even a
complex thought can sometimes be stated briefly. The elegant turn of

phrase has as much a place in law as in literature. Indeed, some of our
most admired and complex legal documents such as the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution are notably brief. Thus, it is not
surprising that the attempted use of elaborative complexity to achieve
fairness in tax law has been debated.2 4 Nevertheless, belief in great
elaboration of the rules as a source of fairness has held a prominent

place in the modern tax scheme for at least the past few decades. This
is particularly evident in many of the regulations issued by the Treasury during most of that period.25
22. Bruce Wolk, Nondiscrimination in Contributionsand Benefits: The New Regulations, 25
GA. L. REv. 71 (1990).
23. Id. at 73.
24. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Reflections on the RegulationsProcess: "Do the Regulations
Have To Be Complex" or "Is Hyperlexis the Manna of the Tax Bar?", 51 TAX NOTES 1441
(1991); Henderson, supra note 19; McCaffery, supra note 19, at 1284-91. Professor McCaffery
offers a useful synthesis of the various points that have been made against the use of complexity
to achieve fairness. These include: the difficulty of calculating what constitutes an equitable
result, the practical difficulty of achieving such results even when we can identify them, and the
problem of interactive inequities that may arise from a group of equitable rules. McCaffery,
supra note 19, at 1284-87. McCaffery also argues that complexity favors the "knowing"
taxpayer over the "unknowing" taxpayer and the "dishonest" taxpayer over the "honest"
taxpayer. Id. at 1289-91. He asserts that complexity encourages taxpayers to be dishonest and
discourages good performance by tax enforcers. Id. at 1291-92. McCaffery's article extends well
beyond the matter of the use of complexity to achieve fairness. He seeks to address the
complexity issue from a variety of perspectives including the use of complexity to achieve
efficiency, politics as a source of complexity, and complexity as rhetoric. Id. at 1298-1312.
Professor McMahon's article reads something like an internal dialogue on the question of
regulatory complexity. He tentatively concludes that much of the complexity is inevitable, but
that it could be better managed through "sympathetic" drafting. McMahon, supra this note, at
1444. For instance, he suggests that the general purposes and principles of each set of
regulations should be more clearly set out in a readily identifiable format. Id.
25. The present tax system owes much to the influence of former Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy and Harvard law professor, Stanley S. Surrey. See In Memorium: Stanley S. Surrey, 98
HARV. L. REV. 328-50 (1984) (tributes by Erwin N. Griswold, William D. Andrews, Richard A.
Musgrave, Donald C. Lubick, Paul R. McDaniel, and Bernard Wolfman). Surrey, who held his
treasury post from 1961 to 1969, advocated the use of regulations to manage the details of tax
law. He believed that complexity was inevitable and that Congress should adopt general statutes
and should delegate to the Treasury the authority "to amplify the statute through Regulations
with details to whatever depth is determined to be necessary for effective operation of the statute
in the particular area." Surrey, supra note 21, at 703. His view was that the regulations should
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Today, the income tax regulations alone are perhaps ten thousand
double-columned pages in length.16 The Treasury regulations set out
in painstaking detail the tax treatment of various transactions in a
multiplicity of circumstances.2 7 They have helped to produce layer
upon layer of technical complexity in U.S. tax law in the name of certainty and fairness.
There are many other causes of tax complexity,2" but the assumption that complexity as embodied by elaborate rules is a product of
be authoritative and detailed. Id. Surrey believed that the Treasury could be trusted to produce
regulations of reasonable fairness and certainty. He acknowledged that interpretative issues
would still arise under the regulations for which resort to the courts would serve as the
taxpayer's protection. But he also believed that in the meantime, "[t]he importance of the issue
for the future can be eliminated through prospective change in the Regulations, so that
interpretative doubts need not cloud the future as they do today. Thus, over-all certainty is
provided, while fairness in the application of Regulations to past transactions is also
maintained." Id. at 705. Despite his advocacy of management of the intricacies of tax law
through detailed regulations, one cannot help but wonder whether Surrey would approve the
degree of detail addressed by the modern tax regulations. In any event, it should also be noted
that the belief in "minute articulation" either by statute or regulations has long held a place in
tax history. See Whitman, supra note 17, at 1198-1202 (describing the development of the
corporate reorganization rules in the 1920s). We can hardly blame Surrey alone for a condition
that has been building almost from the very inception of the income tax.
26. This is only a rough estimate gained from an examination of the five volumes of
regulations reprinted by Commerce Clearing House in paperback. These volumes are not
consecutively paginated making a precise count difficult.
27. In this regard, in addition to the regulations concerning nondiscrimination, the
regulations concerning the time value of money, passive losses, partnership liabilities, and special
allocations spring instantly to my mind. I do not doubt that those readers with other areas of
interest could readily supplement this list.
28. See McCaffery, supra note 19, at 1273 -79 (setting out the "static" and "dynamic" sources
of tax complexity); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Another Look at Tax Law Simplicity, 47 TAX
NOTES 1225, 1227-28 (1990). Besides the search for fairness, Professor Zelinsky attributes tax
complexity to the introduction of "totally new statutory concepts rather than the incremental
use of existing ideas," and the adoption of statutory compromises. Id. at 1228. In a similar vein
Professor Victor Thuronyi has suggested that "in many cases complexity is the result of
legislative compromise or the desire to give preferential treatment to particular groups."
Thuronyi, supra note 20, at 982. Another tax commentator has suggested complexity arises from
the vested interest of tax professionals in such complexity. See Michelle J. White, Why Are
Taxes So Complex and Who Benefits?, 47 TAX NOTES 341 (1990). One person has written that
regulation projects present an economic incentive to the draftsmen to create complexity in order
to insure a market for their future services in complying with those regulations. Schuyler M.
Moore, Tie the Handsof Those That Bind, 47 TAX NOTES 330 (1990). For a response to Mr.
Moore, see Thomas D. Fuller, IRS Regulation Drafters Do Not Have Economic Motive, 47 TAX
NOTES 474 (1990). Still other articles have sought to tie tax complexity to the economic interests
of Congressmen who participate in the tax legislative process. In these articles the tax legislative
process is seen as a contract arrangement in which legislators sell tax benefits to lobbyists. See
Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well? Congress and the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891 (1987); Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S.
McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Declining Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L.
REV. 913 (1987).

Justifying Simplification in Tax Law
fairness is an especially troublesome one because it can serve as a
moral justification for the continuation of that complexity into the
indefinite future. After all, how can we actively pursue tax simplification if to do so will render the law unfair?
The belief that complicated rules enhance fairness proceeds from
the assumption that tax rules determine outcomes in cases. However,
the question of legal determinacy has been a subject of controversy for
decades2 9 and continues as a topic of furious debate for legal scholars."0 To the extent law is indeterminate, it cannot insure fairness
because it is not the law that decides the outcome. 3 1 To the extent law
is determinate there may still be no guarantee of fairness if it can only
be determinate by being arbitrary. Those who opt for what I call the
elaboration approach 32 toward tax rule making apparently believe
they have discovered a safe passage between the devil of arbitrariness
and the deep blue sea of indeterminacy.
II.

DEFINING TERMS

To offer a definition is to step into a trap. This is because we can
only define words with words. Thus, if we define one word we may
29. See, eg., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 104-47 (1936); H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. VII (1961); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR
LAW AND ITS STUDY (1960); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism andFidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
30. See, e.g., Drucilla L. Cornell, Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination
and the Potentialfor TransformativeLegal Interpretation,136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135 (1988); Owen
M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Steve Fuller, Playing
Without a Full Deck- Scientific Realism and the Cognitive Limits of Legal Theory, 97 YALE L.J.
549 (1988); Frederic R. Kellogg, Legal Scholarship in the Temple of Doom: Pragmatism's
Response to Critical Legal Studies, 65 TUL. L. REV. 15 (1990); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Robert J. Lipkin,
Indeterminacy,Justification and Truth in ConstitutionalTheory, 60 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 595
(1992); David Millon, Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1992); Joseph W.
Singer, The Playerand the Cards:Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); Lawrence
B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462
(1987); John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986); Steven L.
Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639 (1990); D'Amato, supra
note 2; Greenawalt, supra note 3; Kress, supra note 4; Schauer, supranote 1. For what amounts
to a symposium on the topic, see Symposium on Law and Philosophy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV.
113-89 (1990). For an even more recent collection of articles on the related topic of the
relationship between rules and the rule of law, see 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 615-852 (1991).

There has been a great deal written on this topic, and I do not offer here a complete catalogue.
As the reader will see, the topic is a big one and its limits are ill-defined. Often the matter of legal
indeterminacy is a beginning point for development of some other theme such as the belief that
law is politics, that law is power, or the negation of those views.
31. See part II.A. Of course, if law is indeterminate it should not prevent fairness either.
32. See part III.C.
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feel obliged to define others. Once we begin defining we may be unable
to stop without some sense that our stopping is an arbitrary act. If our
stopping is an arbitrary act, how can we be telling the whole truth?
One reply is to say that we never tell the whole truth because not every
shade of truth can be captured in words. In a sense, the inability of
words to capture the whole truth is what legal indeterminacy is about.
A.

What Is Legal Indeterminacy?

There are at least two categories of legal indeterminacy as it will be
addressed in this article: practical indeterminacy and theoretical indeterminacy. Practical indeterminacy33 involves the recognition that the
application of law to facts is a sufficiently complex enterprise to allow
some "play" in the outcome. Thus, for instance, the decisionmaker in
a case, by design or through error, may sculpt, characterize, or shade
the facts in such a way as to bring the case within the apparent operation of one rule of law rather than another. This may be regarded as a
weak form of indeterminacy since the indeterminacy is the product of
human frailty and corruptibility rather than the lack of a single theoretically correct legal answer. Practical indeterminacy is simply the
recognition of the power of judges to create different. outcomes by the
manner in which they frame the issues and find or omit the facts.
Theoretical indeterminacy is a stronger view of legal indeterminacy.
This form of indeterminacy does not derive simply from human frailty
or corruptibility but from the difficulties inherent in the use of language and in the intervention of human perception between law and
reality. It may be defined as the theory that legal questions have more
than a single right answer.3 4 At first blush this seems like an innocu33. I use this term rather than "pragmatic" in order to avoid confusion with D'Amato's
phrase "pragmatic indeterminacy." Although D'Amato calls his theory of indeterminacy
pragmatic, it seems that he considers the law theoretically, as well as practically, indeterminate.
D'Amato applies the word pragmatic to his view of indeterminacy b.ecause, he contends, his
theory does not depend on an absolute claim that words have no determinate core meanings.
"[lit is sufficient.., that there can be no determinate evidence that one person's 'core meaning'
for a given word is the same as another person's, or that one person's '-ore meaning' in a given
context does not vary from that same person's 'core meaning' in a different context." D'Amato,
supra note 2, at 179 n. 104. Solum employs the phrase "practical indeterminacy" to refer to the
"flexibility" inherent in the application of legal doctrine. Solum, supra note 30, at 495. This
sense of the phrase is similar to that offered here, the difference being that I use the phrase
"practical indeterminacy" to refer to indeterminacy arising from mistake or deliberate distortion
by the decision maker.
34. Kress, supra note 4, at 283 ("Law is indeterminate to the extent that legal questions lack
single right answers. In adjudication, law is indeterminate to the extent that authoritative legal
materials and methods permit multiple outcomes to lawsuits."); cf. Singer, supra note 30, at 14
("A legal theory or set of rules is completely determinate if it is comprehensive, consistent,'
directive ind self-revising. Any doctrine or set of rules that fails to satisfy any one of these
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ous enough statement. Anyone who has spent some time in the litigation trenches is aware that good arguments can always be made on
both sides of a case.35 But that is not what is meant by this view.
This theory of legal indeterminacy holds that the law does not mandate a single outcome in any given case. This means a case decided by
a judge, for instance, could be rightly decided for either party within
the confines of the law. Taken to extreme, the belief in theoretical
indeterminacy would lead one to conclude that law never determines
outcomes in cases. 36 A certain tension exists between practical and
theoretical indeterminacy that should be noted at the outset. This tension stems from the possibility that as law is rendered more theoretically determinate it may become more practically indeterminate due
to the level of expertise required to apply the law correctly. For
instance, the tax regulations may specify the treatment of a distribution from a retirement account in a theoretically determinate fashion
but the intricacy of those regulations may be such that one not well
versed in that area of law could not find the answer. Had the law been
less intricate, it is possible that the answer might have been more easily discoverable at the expense of being less certain in its application to
the particular case because of the generality of the language employed.
This element of tension between practical and theoretical indeterminacy is, I believe, a recurring issue in tax law.
requirements is indeterminate because it does not fully constrain our choices."); see also Ken
Kress, A Preface to EpistemologicalIndeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 134, 138 (1990). Kress
treats what I call theoretical indeterminacy as being divisible into epistemic indeterminacy and
metaphysical indeterminacy. "Epistemic indeterminacy [speaks to] whether the law can be
known." Id. "Metaphysical indeterminacy speaks to whether there is law." Id. Greenawalt
takes the view that a legal rule provides a determinate answer if "virtually any intelligent person
familiar with the legal system would conclude, after careful study, that the law provides that
answer." Greenawalt, supranote 3, at 3. He adds, as a further criterion of a determinate answer,
that there must be "no powerful argument consonant with the broad premises of a legal system"
supporting a contrary answer. Id. at 3, 85. From a more radical perspective, any attempt to
define indeterminacy is doomed to failure because the meanings of words are themselves
indeterminate. D'Amato, supra note 2, at 161-62. "To 'define' a concept is to specify its
meaning; the true Indeterminist attacks the notion that words can have definably specific,
bounded meanings. In particular, the word 'indeterminate' cannot have a specific, bounded
meaning." Id. at 162 n.36. By way of illustration of D'Amato's point, one could contrast Kress'
view of indeterminacy with that expressed by Professor Drucilla Cornell. "By indeterminacy, I
mean to indicate the 'truth' that without the fusion of meaning and being in Absolute Knowledge
there can be no end of the interpretive process in a definitive grasp of the truth of the actual."
Cornell, supra note 30, at 1144 n.27.
35. I should state for the record that I served as a litigator for about five years. Doubtless my
experiences in that field have influenced the views I am now propounding.
36. See Anthony D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any JudicialDecision?, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 513 (1989).
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What Is Tax Complexity?

Tax complexity has many faces.37 It is a subject that may be
examined from many perspectives, including those of the taxpayer, the
government, the return preparer, the planner, and the scholar. 38 Any
attempt to characterize or categorize tax complexity is likely to be fundamentally arbitrary. In particular, the various divisions of complexity one might derive are likely to overlap and interrelate in a fashion
that renders separate treatment difficult and of limited value. Nevertheless, this Article will consider tax complexity as being composed of
two types: elaborative complexity and judgmental complexity.
Elaborative complexity relates to the level of infarmation and education that must be absorbed in order to begin to decide a tax question.
Thus, the length and detail of tax rules, along with their interconnectedness, are directly related to their elaborative complexity. The
problems associated with elaborative complexity are a function of
human frailty. When there are more rules to know than we can readily assimilate, the law is complex in a very practical sense. This is true
even though the individual rules themselves are relatively simple. It is
useful to appreciate that elaborative complexity contributes to practical indeterminacy because it creates opportunities for taking wrong
turns.
Judgmental complexity refers to the intellectual, moral, and philosophical burdens a tax question may pose for one who has mastered
the rules. When should a transaction be taxed according to its substance rather than its form? When should several transactions occurring in sequence be taxed according to their end result? Is a certain
transaction a realization event? What is the true economic nature of a
certain transaction? These are but a sampling of the judgmentally
complex questions that may be posed by quite ordinary economic
events. Most often judgmental complexity arises because more than
one rule or principle may apply to a given taxable event, and those
potentially applicable principles are in conflict. Resolving the conflict
calls for a fine sense of judgment even of one who well understands all
37. One writer has described three categories of tax complexity: technical complexity,
structural complexity, and compliance complexity. McCaffery, supra note 19, at 1270-72.
Technical complexity refers to "the pure intellectual difficulty of ascertaining the meaning of tax
law." Id. at 1271. Structural complexity concerns the ability to skirt the law by careful
planning. Id. Compliance complexity refers to the difficulty of keeping sufficient records to
satisfy the law. Id. at 1272. For another view of complexity, see Kent W. Smith, Will the Real
Noncompliance Please Stand Up? Complexity and the Measurement of Noncompliance,
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION WORKING PAPER No. 8908 (1988).
38. McCaffery, supra note 19, at 1272.
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of the potentially applicable rules. Just as elaborative complexity correlates with practical indeterminacy, judgmental complexity correlates
with theoretical indeterminacy. The more judgmentally complex a
legal question is, the more theoretically indeterminate is its answer.
Elaborative and judgmental complexity do not describe mutually
exclusive areas of law. There is no reason why they could not be
found together. In fact, it seems probable that they will often occur
together because as the law becomes more elaborate more opportunities for interpretive ambiguity are likely to arise. Even so, as a rule of
thumb we may posit that those persons responsible for the elaborative
complexity of tax rules justify their approach on the grounds that
detailed rules render the law more theoretically certain. Thus, the use
of elaborative complexity is intended to reduce judgmental
complexity.
III.

WHAT DO THOSE PERSONS MAKING AND USING
TAX LAW BELIEVE IN?

A.

The Rule Maker and the Planner

The yin and yang of tax thought are embodied in two hypothetical
individuals, the rule maker and the planner.3 9 The rule maker seeks
symmetry and wholeness in the law. The planner seeks certainty and
narrow truth.
The taxation process in which both the rule maker and the planner
participate begins with the making of the rule imposing the tax. The
planner responds with a variety of maneuvers ranging from compliance to open challenge. Usually, the planner's preferred course of
action is to devise a strategy that deflects the force of the rule without
questioning its legitimacy. In other words, the planner tries to get
outside the rule. But in so doing the planner will seek to allow the
taxpayer to persist in the economic substance of the activity that is the
intended target of the tax. 4°
The moral perspectives of the two sides are distinctly different. To
the rule maker, the chief moral precept of any tax (no matter what its
39. In the discussion that follows, this division is highly idealized and extremely simplistic.
These two "individuals" represent but two aspects of the tax psyche. I ask the reader's
indulgence on the ground that some narrowing of focus is essential to the present enterprise.
40. This effort to skirt the law and the response it draws from the rule maker is the chief
systemic cause of complexity. See McCaffery, supra note 19, at 1275-76. This "dynamic"
complexity may be viewed as an inevitable cyclical phenomena of tax law. When the level of
complexity reaches the point when it is no longer tolerable, it is time for volcanic upheaval in the
form of a tax reform act that so radically alters the legal landscape as to render much of the
previous gamesmanship irrelevant. Id. at 1277-79.
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substantive character and no matter what political choices Congress
may make with respect to its reach) is that it should apply uniformly

to all cases that are economically similar.4" This is a central criterion
of what Professor Lon Fuller might have called "the internal morality" of tax law.42 Thus, to take a simple case, an income tax should
apply to all compensation for labor (assuming Congress chooses to tax
compensation for labor) whether that compensation is received in the
form of cash, services, or property. 4 3 The central fairness or unfairness of the tax is measured by whether it reaches past the form to the
substance of the transaction or other taxable event.'
To the planner, on the other hand, the central moral principle of
taxation is that the taxpayer is entitled to structure his affairs so as to
pay no more tax than the law requires.45 The amount of tax one owes,
when seen from this perspective, is a technical question deserving of a
technical answer. The moral sense of this idea is difficult to state
clearly. I think it proceeds from a belief that although the government
has the power to take the taxpayer's property, it has no intrinsic right
to a set amount of his property. Thus, it is only entitled to what it can
get and no more.46 In this game of catch-as-catch-can, the taxpayer is
41. See JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX ch. 2 (1989). As Professor Dodge discusses,
tax fairness has several aspects. For example, Dodge views the ability to pay as a "core idea of
substantive tax fairness." Id. at 85.
42. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-44, 46-91 (1964). Fuller delineates
eight elements of law's internal morality. These include: (1) the creation of general rules, (2)
making them public, (3) making them prospective in their application (usually), (4) making the
rules clear, (5) avoiding contradictions in the rules, (6) avoiding rules that cannot be complied
with, (7) stability of rules, and (8) congruence between theory and practice. Id. The tax
principle of treating all cases according to their economic substance has a similar, quasiprocedural aspect. One can justify this principle on two main grounds. First, its strikes us as fair
in the sense that like cases are treated alike. Second, it fosters economic neutrality in the tax
system which, in turn, fosters economic efficiency in the market. See DAVID F. BRADFORD,
BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 46 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter BLUEPRINTS]; DAVID F.
BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 178-79 (1986).

43. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (1991).
44. See, e.g., Wolder v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1974) (transaction in the form
of a bequest held to be taxable as compensation).
45. The words of Judge Learned Hand in his opinion in Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809
(2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), have almost become scripture on this point. He wrote,
"[a]ny one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to
increase one's taxes." Id. at 810.
46. This view may be seen to proceed from a skeptical view of government and of law: a view
of government as a necessary evil and of law as its necessary tool in the efforts of humankind to
live together insecurity. "[lit is the sense of their weakness and imperfection that keeps mankind
together; that demonstrates the necessity of this union; and therefore is the solid and natural
foundation, as well as the cement of society .... ." JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON
GOVERNMENT 132 (London, Oxford Univ. Press 1891).
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not obliged to roll over and play dead. The government has the
power, and the taxpayer has his wits. To deny the taxpayer the right
to use his wits (or more likely the wits of the tax planner) to avoid the
tax would, in the taxpayer's mind, further skew the odds in the government's favor in what is already an uneven contest.4'
While the rule maker exalts substance over form48 as the embodiment of fairness, the planner tends to equate tax fairness with certainty.4 9 This is because he must be reasonably certain what the law is
before he can begin to determine whether and how the effect of the law
can be avoided."0 Moreover, one can argue that it is a citizen's fundamental right in a system of laws to be forewarned of the law's requirements. 51 In any event, it is part of the planner's task to draw from the
rule maker her precise position on any particular point of interpretation. Like anyone else, the planner may decry the complexity of the
law, yet he is driven by his task to ask questions and to seek binding
commitments from the rule maker on specific matters. Every answer
he obtains, whether it be by statute, regulation, or ruling, adds to the
elaborative complexity of the law.5'
The differing versions of tax fairness just described do not always
clash head on. However, they frequently serve as justifications for differing interpretations of the law. The rule maker's vision of fairness
takes an inherently broader view of what constitutes "law" than the
planner's vision of fairness. At least this has been true in the past. As
will be discussed, the elaboration approach to rule making, recently in
47. The unevenness of the contest results, of course, from the rule maker's ability to make and
change the rules.
48. For the moment, I am disregarding the conceptual difficulties inherent in the substance
versus form dichotomy. However, I do address them elsewhere in this article. See part IV.C.
49. It is worth noting that in the real world of tax litigation, neither the government nor the
taxpayer are as consistent in their positions as this idealized description implies. Both sides are
sufficiently opportunistic to dip into the other's bag of tricks as the situation warrants. See, e.g.,
McDonald's Restaurants of Ill., Inc. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982) (government
argued form and taxpayer argued substance).
50. Sometimes it is advantageous to come within the scope of a rule (e.g., a safe harbor). In
such cases the same principle applies.
51. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Unenumerated ConstitutionalRights and the Rule of
Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 615, 615-16 (1991) (describing John Locke's conception of
the rule of law).
52. This is particularly true since private letter rulings began to be published. I suppose that
strictly speaking, rulings by the Service are not law; however, they are often treated as such. In
the corporate reorganizations area, for instance, a favorable advance ruling from the Service is
practically a sine qua non for the completion of any deal.
53. See, eg., Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952) (compare the majority opinion
of Justice Black with the dissenting opinions of Justice Jackson and Justice Douglas).
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vogue, narrows the meaning of "law" in a highly important fashion
that tends to accept the view of fairness taken by the planner.
B.

The Social Context Approach to Rule Making

The rule maker can anticipate that the planner will seek to get
outside the rule imposing the tax, and may choose between two very
different strategies to prevent avoidance of the tax. The first approach
is to write the rule in broad terms so as to cast a net around all economically similar activities no matter the form in which they are carried out. This is called the social context approach because it asks
those who apply the law to look beyond the rule itself for its proper
application and to focus instead on the social justice of taxing particular transactions in particular fashions. The social context approach
asks that laws be applied in light of their purposes, and, consequently,
regards law itself as something more than duly promulgated written
rules. It is an approach that is thoroughly consonant with the internal
morality of tax law as viewed from the rule maker's perspective.
An early example of the social context approach is the Code's treatment of the concept of "income." Nowhere is the -word "income"
defined in the Code.5 4 Instead the Code focuses on differentiating
"gross" income from "taxable" income. Gross income is "all income
from whatever source derived."5 5 Taxable income is "gross income
minus the deductions allowed by this chapter."56 So what is income?
The answer is established in three main ways. First, a non-exclusive
list of examples of gross income is set out in the Code.5 7 Second, the
question is left to the courts.58 As might be expected the courts have
not always arrived at results that were acceptable to Congress. Moreover, there are always pressures to alter the operation of the law with
respect to one item or another. Thus, the third way irvolves the occasional return by Congress to the scene of its earlier act. Over time, a
series of provisions have grown up stating that some items such as
54. Or even in the regulations, for that matter. However, the regulations under § 61 are
showing the same signs of proliferation noted elsewhere. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21 (1992)
(taxation of fringe benefits).
55. I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 1992).
56. Id. § 63(a).
57. Id. § 61(a)(1)-(15).
58. Two of the more notable cases attempting to define income are Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (Income is that "derived from capital, from labor, cr from both combined,
provided it be understood to include profit or gain through a sale or conversion of capital assets
.... "), and Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (Items of income are
"undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete
dominion.").
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alimony, prizes, scholarships, and personal injury recoveries either are
or are not includable in gross income.5 9 The result is a moderately
complex, moderately stable, and moderately clear set of rules that the
average informed citizen could understand in principle (though he
may not agree with them). The concept of income in tax law remains
somewhat indeterminate, and, it has been suggested, this is necessary
if we wish to be fair in our treatment of individual cases.'
C. The ElaborationApproach to Rule Making
In contrast to the social context approach, the modern trend in rule
making has been to set out the circumstances where the tax applies in
minute detail. This is called the elaboration approach because it looks
to the rules themselves for their proper application by specifying all
the circumstances in which they apply. In its most elevated form, this
approach is distinguished not only by the length of the rules but by
their intricate interdependence. Often such rules cannot be applied by
simply finding the single rule applicable to a given case. Instead, one
must master all of the rules in order to apply any one of them, because
only mastery of all the rules will provide the answer to which rules
apply.
The elaborate architecture of these modem rules is due in part to
their development by a handful of people over a limited time span.
The rules are constructed as one might construct a house whose owner
is eagerly awaiting occupancy. That is, the tendency is to assign specialized craftspersons to their various tasks and have them work to
completion of an entire edifice of reason. The incrementalism characteristic of the social context approach is avoided to the extent such
avoidance is practically possible. Because these rule makers are specialists they can make their rules quite elaborate while maintaining
some degree of internal coherence. The goal of the rule makers is to
anticipate all likely questions in advance of their arising. In this way,
the elaboration approach seeks to adhere to the rule maker's broad
conception of fairness while also being consonant with the planner's
desire for certainty because it focuses on technical differentiation,
completeness, and specificity.
The elaboration approach is aptly illustrated by the passive activity
loss rules of section 46961 and, more specifically, by the regulations
59. See I.R.C. §§ 71-135 (vest 1992).
60. See Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REv. 45, 47-48, 104-05 (1990).
"If income is ultimately based on fairness, as I think it should be, and implicitly has been in tax
policy analysis, then we must live with the indeterminacy of the concept .... " Id. at 105.
61. I.R.C. § 469 (West 1992).
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under it. Fortuitously, an exemplary demonstration of both the elaboration approach and of the recent efforts to turn away from that
approach are provided by the temporary regulations defining the word
"activity" for purposes of applying the passive loss rules.62 In general,
the passive loss rules are intended to combat the use of abusive tax
shelters 63 by denying taxpayers the ability to deduct losses from "passive" activities against income earned in non-passive activities. (The
distinction between passive and non-passive activities is the subject of
its own set of rules.64 ) The definition of "activity" is crucial to the
operation of this elaborate provision because the aggregation or nonaggregation of various "undertakings" 65 into a single activity could
work to the taxpayer's detriment or in his favor. For example, suppose a taxpayer has two investment undertakings one of which generates income and the other of which generates losses. If the two
undertakings can be grouped together as either a passive activity or as
a non-passive activity, the income from the one can be offset for tax
purposes by the losses from the other. On the other hand, if the loss
undertaking is classified as a passive activity while the income undertaking is classified as a non-passive activity, the income will be taxable
without any offset. Thus the efficacy of the passive loss rules depends
in part upon a definition of "activity" that prevents the taxpayer from
aggregating undertakings as he chooses.6 6
When the Treasury began the task of defining "activity" it had a
general definition already at hand. "Congress indicated that an 'activity' is intended to refer to the integrated and interrelated economic
operations that, on the basis of all the facts and circumstances, are the
appropriate unit for the measurement of gain or loss. "167 Apparently
62. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4T (1989).
63. An abusive tax shelter may be described as when a taxpayer ptirposely seeks to generate
deductions in excess of income from an activity in order to protect from taxation the income
from another activity. Tax shelters frequently depend on large depreciation deductions for their
efficacy. Thus, in attacking passive activities, Congress may be seen a; having avoided tackling
the problem of unrealistic depreciation deductions permitted by the tax law. For an interesting
treatment of the passive loss rules by allegory, see Daniel S. Goldberg, The Kingdom of Pal. A
Parable of Tax Shelters and the Passive Activity Loss Rules, 51 TAX NOTES 225 (1991).
64. The activity is passive with respect to any given individual if the individual does not
"materially participate" in the activity. I.R.C. § 469(c)(1), (h) (West 1992); see also Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T (1991) (where "material participation" is defined).
65. This is a term utilized by the regulations to describe a subpart of an activity. See Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4T(a)(3) (1991).
66. See Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1, 42-44 (1988).
67. American Bar Association Section of Taxation Task Force on Passive Losses, Preamble to
the Comments on Activity Regs, 44 TAX NoTEs 1277, 1278 (1989) [hereinafter ABA Report]
(citing S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 713, 759 (1986)).
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this definition, and ones like it, were viewed as too uncertain of application. Moreover, the Treasury's task was also complicated by the
fact that neither a narrow nor a broad definition of "activity" would
have been universally optimal regardless of whether viewed from the
government's perspective or from the taxpayer's perspective.6 8 In
other words, sometimes a broad definition favors the government and
sometines a broad definition favors the taxpayer. The same is true of a
narrow definition.
The solution chosen by the Treasury in the temporary regulations
was an intricate building block approach. "Operations" were combined into "undertakings" and "undertakings" were combined into
"activities." 69 Depending on a variety of factors, separate undertakings could be separate activities or more than one undertaking might
be aggregated into a single activity.7 0 In some cases aggregation was
elective.7 1 Moreover, the regulations contained a number of facts and
circumstances tests and rebuttable presumptions.7 2 Thus, even though
the temporary regulations defining the single word "activity" were
some 100 typed pages in length,7 3 they were not entirely mechanical in
operation even when taken on their own terms. In addition, despite
their flexibility (indeterminacy?), the regulations were also attacked
for their arbitrariness.74 A third criticism leveled at the activity regulations was that they were so complex that even accountants and lawyers found them "exceedingly difficult" to apply.7 5 Stated another
way, the elaborative complexity of the rules rendered them practically
indeterminate.
In response to the criticisms leveled against the temporary regulations, the Service has recently issued a proposed regulation defining
"activity" in a fashion that is intended to be easier to apply than the
68. See David H. Evaul & Todd Wallace, Passive Activity Losses: Definition of Activity, 44
TAX NOTES 1257, 1258-59 (1989). In general, a taxpayer with trade or business losses will
prefer a broad definition of "activity" so that the losses can be offset by income from other
activities. Id. However, in the sale context taxpayers might prefer a narrow definition of
"activity" because sale of a passive activity releases suspended losses for use against non-passive
income. Id.
69. Id. at 1261.
70. Id. at 1261-62.
71. Id. at 1262.
72. Id.
73. ABA Report, supra note 67, at 1278. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4T (1991).
74. "[I]n an attempt to provide certainty, the regulations can lead to unfair results that do not
reflect economic reality." ABA Report, supra note 67, at 1278-79.
75. Id. The ABA report sets out 21 steps involved in the application of the regulations.
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approach taken in the temporary regulations.7 6 In thds particular case,
the government seems to be giving up on the elaboration approach.
Instead of continuing with the intricate system of building blocks contained in the temporary regulations, the proposed regulation adopts a
facts and circumstances test in combination with a few supporting
rules.77 This harkens back to the social context approach. Such concrete actions as these give some indication that Secretary Goldberg's
commitment to simplification is having an effect. The initial reception
from the tax bar to this change of direction has been positive.7" It will
be interesting to see whether this return to the social context approach
can maintain its momentum as efforts are made to simplify such inherently difficult areas as tax arbitrage,7 9 original issue discount," and
partnership special allocations.8 1
D. The Two Approaches in Contrast
Each approach to rule making has its advantages and disadvantages. The social context approach can be brief and easily understood
in outline, but it depends on a strong enforcement system and the willingness of judges to apply the law so as to treat matters that are similar
in substance in the same way even if they are dissimilar in form. The
social context approach is also incremental and evolutionary. Thus, it
is subject to uncertainty and tends to encourage litigation. Because
many of the judges upon which it depends are not tax specialists, the
social context approach removes much authority over the sound
administration of the tax system from the tax elite. It might be suggested that the social context approach lends itself to uninformed
judicial meddling8 2 and taxpayer abuse. Alternatively, one might
76. Robert Manning & Christopher Bergin, ProposedPassive Loss Regs Try Again to Define
"Activity," 55 TAX NOTES 885 (1992); see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4, 57 Fed. Reg. 20802
(1992).
77. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4, 57 Fed. Reg. 20802 (1992).
78. See Richardson et al., supra note 14 (reporting that the proposed regulation received a
favorable reception at the ABA tax section annual meeting held in Washington, D.C. the week
following its issuance).
79. Cf Treas. Reg. §§ 1.148-OT-1OT (1991).
80. Cf Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1271-1 to 1.1275-5, 51 Fed. Reg. 234-31 (1986).
81. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (1991); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1T (1991). It's possible a
two track approach will develop. In the areas where only an elite few taxpayers are concerned,
elaborative complexity may continue. In areas affecting a great many taxpayers, less detailed
rules may be promulgated. There is some discussion of such a two track system in the literature.
See, eg., John W. Lee, The Art of Regulation Drafting: Structured DiscretionaryJustice Under
Section 35, 44 TAX NoTEs 1029, 1031 nn.17-18 (1989).
82. The nonspecialist judiciary is often considered an impediment to sound tax policy. For
example, Professor James Eustice has called the Supreme Court a "loose cannon on a rolling
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characterize it as populist and as tending to inject an element of common sense into tax law.
The elaboration approach, in contrast, seems to take away from
judges the discretion to make bad decisions. However, its success
depends upon the ability of the rule maker to be extremely foresighted
in anticipating all the variations in form that an economically similar
legal event might take (or be shaped to take by a clever planner). For
this reason the modem rules are often long, detailed, highly interwoven, and seek to address all possible contingencies. Viewed in a positive light, this approach uses great and fairminded elaboration to
reduce the law to a series of mechanical rules whose application
requires little or no human discretion in order to arrive at an outcome
that treats all cases according to their substance.8 3 From this reductionist perspective, the elaborative complexity of tax law is justified by
its certain and uniform fairness when applied by one who has mastered it. Of course, mastery of the.rules is rendered extremely difficult
by their complexity and, thus, only an elite few will do so. This in
itself would strike many as unfair.8 4 But the deterministic fairness of
the rules in the hands of one who has mastered them is seen (by those
making the rules) to outweigh the unfairness proceeding from their
complexity.8 5 This rule-minded account of the operation of tax law
seeks to make the law a precise and exacting tool for coordinating
human activity.
E.

The Moral Consequences of the ElaborationApproach

A side effect of the elaboration approach is to render the maneuvers
of the planner less vulnerable to a contextual substance over form
deck" in the field of tax. James S.Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practitioner,45 TAx L.
REV. 7, 15 n.22 (1989).
83. One of the adaptations of practitioners, especially accountants, to this phenomena is the
widespread use of flow charts. These devices are designed to lead one through a complex maze of
regulations by answering yes or no questions. See, e.g., C. Ellen MacNeil et al., Revenue
Procedure 92-20: Flowchart and Comparison of Transition Rules, 54 TAX NOTES 1413 (1992);
Becky Solether & Steve Coleman, Flowchartsfor Section 469, 44 TAX NOTES 1254 (1989). In the
latter article, three flowcharts presented in two printed pages purport to lead one through the
since withdrawn regulations defining what constitutes an "activity" under the passive loss rules.
In the same edition of Tax Notes there is a twenty-five page article that does something similar.
See Evaul & Wallace, supra note 68, at 1257. The regulations themselves were over forty pages
of double columns of fine print. See CCH INCOME TAX REGULATIONS § 1.469-4T (1991). If
you were a harried tax professional in the midst of the filing season, which of these three sources
would you be inclined to rely upon?
84. See, eg., Surrey & Brannon, supra note 20, at 921.
85. For example, the preamble of the since withdrawn activity regulations took the position
that "the potential for unfair results is outweighed by the 'certainty' of the results under the
regulations." ABA Report, supra note 67, at 1279.
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argument by the rule maker. Since the rule maker has chosen to detail
her precise position, arguably she is obliged to live by her own rules to
the letter. Moreover, it seems likely that courts will incline toward
greater literalism in their interpretations of the rules in the face of such
detailed analysis.8 6 Thus, the elaboration approach to tax law is, in a
sense, a capitulation to the moral perspective of the planner. The
length and specificity of the rules is an implicit concession that the
rules are everything; the rules are the whole law. If the literal language of a rule does not fit a transaction, that transaction is outside its
application.
If rules can be simultaneously determinate and fair, perhaps this
capitulation to the planner's perspective is not a problem. If it is possible to achieve fair outcomes in a mechanical fashion, then literalism is
not a hindrance to a sound tax system. On the other hand, if the elaboration approach overestimates or misunderstands the determinacy of
rules and the connections between rules and fair outcomes, serious
problems arise. Thus, for example, the elaboration approach to rule
making may rob the law of its ethical spirit. The ethical dimension of
law comes into the elaboration approach in the creation of the rule, if
it comes in at all. Questions of fairness are addressed when the rule is
drafted. The detailed nature of the rule as drafted denies the necessity
for an ethical perspective in its application because the decision maker
has no discretion in applying the rule. If elaborate rules are indeterminate, however, the quest for justice may become lost in a thicket of
rules from which no moral compass can guide us. On the other hand,
if the rules are determinate but unfair, literalism may cause rigid
enforcement of the legal rules in every situation without regard to
individual circumstances and equities. "[L]aw might become a procrustean tyrant., 87 How can the elaboration account of law embraced
86. Professor McMahon also suggests that the courts may be becoming more literal in their
interpretation of the tax law. See McMahon, supra note 24, at 1443. However, he sees this
literalism as a cause of tax complexity rather than a response to it. Id. He argues that "[s]ome
lengthy regulations have been spawned by judicial decisions that did not adequately guard the
fisc." Id. In support of this proposition he cites a court of claims decision. My response is that
judges who are not tax specialists (such as claims court judges) must find the present elaborative
complexity overwhelming. In the face of such complexity, how is a ncnspecialist judge to gain
the perspective on a case to allow anything other than a literal approach to the law? In addition,
when the regulations give the appearance of addressing all contingencies, a judge is implicitly
instructed that his discretion to construe the law in a non-literal fashion is limited.
87. See Steven D. Smith, Reductionism in Legal Thought, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 68, 84 (1991).
Professor Smith provides some interesting ideas that bear upon the elaboration approach to rule
making so prevalent in tax law. Smith argues that law performs multiple functions, and that,
often, those persons writing about, applying, or creating the law tend to reduce the law to the
single function most relevant to their instant enterprise. Id. at 68-75. He divides reductionism
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by modem tax law drafters evade this criticism? If it does so, it is only
by being so elaborative as to adequately address all or nearly all possible "individual circumstances and equities." In short, once we
embrace elaborate rules as the primary approach to tax law, we condemn ourselves to increasingly elaborate systems of rules in order to
escape the charge of arbitrariness. This in itself may be sufficient basis
for seeking a less literal-minded approach to tax law. But even if we
appear to escape arbitrariness by great elaboration, our efforts may
still be wasted. If tax law, no matter how elaborate, is still indeterminate, then the elaboration approach will not only fail to achieve its
aim, it also may engender great harm because its intricate structure
will render it particularly vulnerable to abuse, confusion, and misunderstanding. Thus, if we are to choose rightly in deciding how far we
should rely on elaborate rules to achieve fairness, we must be concerned with the nature and extent of tax law's indeterminacy.
into three functional accounts of law: the dispute resolution account, the coordinative account,
and the meliorative account. Id. The dispute resolution account focuses upon the function of
law as a mechanism for "the authoritative resolution of disputes." Id. at 69. The coordinative
account of law focuses upon the function of law in "the coordination of human interaction." Id.
at 72. The meliorative account of the law focuses on the law as a vehicle for positive social
change. Id. at 74. Of the three forms of reductionism described by Smith, the coordinative
account correlates most closely with the philosophy embodied in modem tax law. This approach
defines law "as the 'enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.'" Id. at
73 (quoting LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAv 96 (rev. ed. 1969)). Smith asserts that the
three accounts of law are both complementary and conflicting. Id. at 76. The potential for
conflict arises because the ultimate goals of the three accounts may differ. For example, the most
"rhetorically persuasive resolution" to a dispute may not comport with the applicable rule of
law. "The longstanding tension between 'law' and 'equity' is one manifestation of that conflict."
Id. at 77. When the accounts conflict, we are forced to choose. Smith suggests that "the most
obvious way to avoid or resolve conflicts is to determine that one vision is primary and the others
are subordinate." Id. For example,
one might assert that the meliorative vision of law is fundamental: The purpose of law is to
achieve the best and most just social order that is practically attainable. By this view, the
coordination and dispute resolution accounts do not describe independent functions of law;
rather, the adoption of rules regulating human interaction and the resolution of disputes are
simply means used by the law to achieve its objective of attaining, and maintaining, a just
social order.
Id. at 77-78. No matter which vision we embrace as primary, we are on the path of reductionism.
.d. at 80-81. Smith asserts that reductionism tends to lead to a distortion of legal understanding.
Id. at 81. In Smith's words, "a reductionist depiction of law, regardless of which form the particular reductionism takes, will distort legal understanding by presenting one perspective as if it
were the whole picture." Id. at 84. Of particular interest, for present purposes, is his view of the
distortions resulting from establishing the primacy of law's coordinative function because this is
the form of reductionism that best characterizes modem tax law. Relying on the realists, Karl
Llewellyn and Jerome Frank, Smith contends that the coordinative account in its concern for
formal rules neglects "other vital features and functions of law." Id. at 83. Although Smith is
vague as to what these vital features and functions are, he appears to believe that the coordinative
account of law tends to overestimate the determinacy of rules and that in so doing the image of
law it conveys is incomplete. Id. at 83-84.
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TO WHAT EXTENT IS TAX LAW INDETERMINATE?

The degree of indeterminacy of any particular area of law, such as
tax, may be no different than the degree of indeterminacy of law generally. The jurisprudential scholars whose works are discussed here
often seem to assume this. Based on reasons that will be developed
during the course of this next part, I doubt that all areas of law are
equally determinate or indeterminate. Nonetheless, the various claims
and arguments addressed in the coming sections received their initial
development in other legal contexts.88 Much of the determinacy
debate is connected with the critical legal studies movement and with
its critics.8 9 This connection is of no particular concern in the present
context. This Article is not about law as power or law as politics nor
is it concerned with the refutation of those ideas. It is about the
strengths and failings of rules.
A beginning point for discussion of tax law's indeterminacy is the
empirical data concerning levels of taxpayer compliance.
A.

The Empirical Evidence

If we can show as a matter of fact that the vast majority of taxpayers pay their taxes in amounts that roughly correspond to what the
government believes it is owed by them, does this prove that tax law is
largely determinate? As discussed later, some commentators contend
that the determinacy of law is proven by the many cases that do not
require litigation.9" The indeterminist response is to argue that the
mere fact that most taxpayers do not end up before the tax court really
tells us nothing.9 1 Perhaps most returns just reflect one person's vision
of what he should pay.9 2 Perhaps enforcement is too lax. Perhaps
most audited cases do not go to trial because the amount in controversy makes litigation not cost effective.
88. A benefit of making these arguments in a specific legal context is that the people who are
obliged to employ the law in that specific context are better able to judge the merits of the
arguments. A secondary benefit is that for many such persons there is an exposure to useful
philosophical outlooks that they would otherwise be inclined to ignore or, at least, to undervalue.
Chiefly, however, the utility of making our points about legal indeterminacy in the context of tax
law is that we have the helpful focus provided by the main problem sought to be addressed: the
matter of tax complexity.
89. See authorities cited supra note 30.
90. See infra part IV.B.
91. D'Amato, supra note 2, at 166.
92. Will Rogers has been attributed with saying "[t]he income tax has made more liars out of
the American people than golf has. Even when you make a tax form out on the level, you don't
know when it's through if you are a crook or a martyr." See B.C. Forbes, Thoughts on the
Business Life, FORBES, July 10, 1989, at 144.
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There exists empirical evidence concerning income tax return accuracy that may shed some light on this subject. Although the Service
audits fewer than one percent of all returns,9 3 it has long had a program aimed at determining the rate of taxpayer compliance with the
tax laws.9 4 This program, the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement
Program (TCMP), uses audits of random statistical samples of filed
returns as its basic approach.9" The focus of this analysis is underreporting of income. 96 A recent analysis of some97 of the data collected
by TCMP indicates that, on average, Americans who file returns pay
about nine percent less in taxes than they should each year.9" An earlier report by the American Bar Association Commission on Taxpayer
Compliance (Commission report) indicates that the overall "tax gap"
from legitimate economic activities equals nineteen percent of all taxes
owed.9 9 According to the Service this tax gap amounted to $100 billion in 1986.100 The generally accepted causes of noncompliance are
tax cheating and mistakes.10 1 The Commission report singles out the
fraying moral fabric of our society as a chief cause of noncompliance. 0 2 In addressing the question of indeterminacy that same report
said:
[t]he vast majority of tax matters can readily and unambiguously be
classified as compliant or noncompliant. The issues that are still uncertain may be a major focus of tax practitioners' activity, but the number
93. See Tim Gray & Ian K. Louden, IRS Giving Better Phone Advice-To Those Who Can
Get Through, 46 TAx NoTEs 1495, 1496 (1990). The rate of audits has been declining for several
years. Id.
94. Susan B. Long & David Burnham, The Numbers Game: Changes in Tax Compliance
During the Last 25 Years?, 46 TAX NoTEs 1177, 1179 (1990).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1180. Of course, overreporting of income could be proof of indeterminacy as well.
97. The government is stingy with TCMP information because it fears such information
could be used to figure out "the discriminant function" (DIF). The DIF is used to sort returns as
part of the effort to detect tax evasion. The Service's reasoning, apparently, is that if one could
figure out the DIF, one could figure out how to evade taxes without getting caught. See J.
Andrew Hoerner, IRS to Perform StatisticalAnalyses of TCMP Datafor PrivateResearchers, 45
TAX NOTES 1054 (1989).
98. Long & Burnham, supra note 94, at 1180 tbl. 1. I am greatly simplifying what the article
actually says. The article's focus was the issue of whether the rate of compliance is changing
over time. Its conclusion on this point was that the data was unclear but that, in general,
compliance levels had not changed much over the previous 20 years. Id. at 1184-85.
99. American Bar Association Commission on Taxpayer Compliance, Report and
Recommendations on Taxpayer Compliance, 41 TAX LAW. 329 (1988) [hereinafter Commission
Report]. The tax gap may be defined as the difference between the taxes actually paid and the
taxes that are owed. See id. at 329-30.
100. Id. at 334.
101. Id. at 330.
102. Id. at 336.
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of these issues, and their importance relative to the size of the tax gap, is
probably relatively small.1" 3
Thus, although the potential for indeterminacy has been recognized in
some quarters, 104 the basic stance of the empirical approach is that tax
law is determinate.
Despite reflecting a firm belief in tax determinacy, the Commission
report also notes that "about one third of taxpayers do not take deductions they believe they deserve" in part because they are unsure
whether they are truly entitled to them. 105 Elsewhere the report states
"tax laws are often ambiguous, so there is more uncertainty about
what is required for compliance."'11 6 The report assumes that these
are problems of education rather than of genuine uncertainty in the
07
law. 1
Another empirical approach to the problem of compliance, perhaps
more connected to tax indeterminacy, is to consider the competence of
tax professionals to resolve tax questions. For the past few years
Money magazine has sought to test the abilities of professional return
preparers and IRS personnel to give accurate tax advice.'0 s Recently,
in testing the return preparers, it gave the same tax return preparation
assignment to fifty different tax professionals. 01 9 As it turned out, no
two of the preparers came up with the same tax liability figure." 0
According to the people who created the assignment, the bottom line
should have been $12,308.111 The answers ranged from $9,809 to
$21,216.1 12 The analysis of the competence of government employees
to provide correct tax advice reflected a similar lack of consensus. The
test of IRS personnel consisted of a phone survey where the callers
asked typical tax questions. Money found that in a recent year the
103. Id. at 339.
104. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 37, at 1 ("Complexity... affects the determination of the
incidence and extent of noncompliance and may in many cases make the measurement of
noncompliance indeterminate.").
105. Commission Report, supra note 99, at 345. Other reasons given were "ignorance or
forgetfulness, insufficient records, perceptions that the deduction was tao trivial or complicated
and fear of audits." Id.
106. Id. at 352.
107. Id. at 368-83.
108. Denise M. Topolnicki, The Pros Flub Our Third Annual T'x-Return Test, MONEY,
March 1990, at 90.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The hypothetical assumed a family of four with annual income of $132,000. Id. The
range of issues included in the hypothetical were somewhat more complicated than that found in
a typical return, "but the problems weren't unusual." Id. at 91-92.
112. Id.
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Service personnel gave erroneous tax advice twenty-eight 11percent
of
4
the time.1 I3 This was a big improvement over prior years.
This information concerning tax professionals is not particularly
reassuring. Moreover, the question naturally arises, how do we reconcile this result with the apparently good compliance rate for the general population? One explanation might be that tax law is more
determinate for the common tax issues arising among the general populace than for the tax issues likely to be confronted by tax professionals. This view probably has some merit. However, if one accepts this
interpretation, one may be in the position of accepting that elaborative
complexity contributes to indeterminacy (either practical or theoretical or both) rather than legal certainty. Tax professionals, after all,
are the ones who are most likely to directly confront those areas of the
tax law that are characterized by elaborate rules. If complexity
increases indeterminacy, that would seem to undermine the assumption that elaborative complexity can simultaneously make the law fair
and certain. 1 5
It seems likely an indeterminist would argue that the difficulty with
relying on empirical data to determine the degree of indeterminacy in
tax law is that the reliability of the data rests on the assumption that
the law is determinate in the first place. The data purports to measure
the number of errors by taxpayers and tax professionals, but it can
only do so if a single right answer exists against which to measure the
actions of the taxpayers and tax professionals. Thus, any effort to
determine the degree of tax indeterminacy by reference to empirical
data runs into tautological difficulties. Nonetheless, the fact that the
federal income tax produces about eighty percent of the income that
those who administer it believe it should produce can be viewed as
113. Denise M. Topolnicki et al., SurpriselThe IRS Gets More Helpful, MONEY, March 1990,
at 97.
114. Id. In the two previous years the error rate had been nearly 50% in 1988 and over 40%
in 1989. Id.
115. Another interpretation would be to suggest that the high degree of compliance is a
function of the fact that most people simply fill out their tax returns according to the directions
accompanying the forms. The forms "channel" the taxpayer through the taxing scheme in a way
that tends to reduce or disregard legal uncertainties. I hardly need to add that in general the
forms are designed to foster and support the Service's interpretation of the law. Thus, the high
degree of compliance may not be proof of a high degree of determinacy in the tax law. Instead, it
may be symptomatic of the way in which the government is able to stack the deck through the
mechanism of the tax forms. This view might also explain why tax professionals have a harder
time "complying" with the law than the general public. The professionals are more likely than
the general public to work from the raw materials (statutes, regulations, cases, rulings, and the
like) in arriving at their judgments about the law. Under this circumstance, the indeterminacy of
the law is more likely to reveal itself in the form of a lack of consensus about its application.
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evidence that tax law is generally determinate, especially if we accept
that much of the tax gap is the result of deliberate underpayment of
taxes. Perhaps we can say that the empirical evidence establishes a
prima facia case of generalized determinacy in the federal income tax.
B.

The Easy Tax Case

Another way to examine tax indeterminacy that is closely related to
the empirical approach is to consider the extent to which the easy case
is the prevalent type of tax case. Those who believe law is largely
determinate contend that there are many easy case3." 6 They say the
only thing that prevents this fact from being readily apparent is that
lawyers from their earliest training tend to focus on the hard cases.'17
In this context, the hard cases include all litigated cases."" Lawyers
never see most of the easy cases because they are never litigated.
Kress contends that all of the hundreds of minor acts one may engage
in during the course of a single day illustrate the law's determinacy."19
Thus, when one brushes one's teeth, according to Kress, one has
engaged in an act with determinate legal consequences. A radical
indeterminist response to this suggestion might include pointing out
that one who brushes her teeth with cocaine has engaged in an act
with indeterminate legal consequences. Of course such an argument
has an absurd quality. But it is illustrative of the dangers inherent in
hypothetical cases, minor though they may appear to be. Perhaps a
more serious response is to inquire whether the fact that one engages
in an act of no legal consequence such as brushing one's teeth with
pepsodent is ever proof of law's determinacy. I would suggest that the
fact that I can hang my hat on a peg near the entrance to my office
door does not prove that a statute prohibiting me from hanging my
hat on a fire alarm is determinate. Proofs of law's determinacy, in
order to be persuasive, should involve circumstances of probable legal
consequences. 120 Thus, for instance, proof of the determinacy of tax
116. Kress, supra note 4, at 296-97; Solum, supra note 30, at 471-72; see also Frederick
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985). Schauer concludes there are no easy cases
at any level where a case is contested, but that easy cases still abound. Id. at 411.
117. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 30, at 496.
118. Schauer, supra note 116, at 411.
119. Id. Solum echoes this view. See Solum, supra note 30, at 471-72.
120. Greenawalt says that any estimate of the extent of determinacy in the law "[tlo be useful
...should encompass only acts that are, or plausibly might be, within the domain of particular
legal standards." Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 37. Schauer seems to suggest that law's
determinacy should be tested by reference to its application to a "legal event." Schauer, supra
note 116, at 413. He defines a "legal event" as any "divergence between the behavior that would
have occurred but for the law and the behavior that occurred becs.use of the law." Id. In
contrast to this view, Solum argues that matters of no legal consequences, even if they are not
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law should involve financial transactions or events within the contemplation of one of our taxing schemes. 121
To a tax professional, the thought that tax law is pervasively indeterminate may seem an utterly alien point of view. We assume that
there are a great many "easy" cases that the law adequately addresses
so that there is no uncertainty about the outcome. For example, when
those of us who teach tax law attempt to teach our students a "right"
answer to a particular question, we often do so by resorting to examples which, to all appearances, have only one proper legal resolution. 122 Consider the case of an exchange of property with a basis 123
of $100 for other property worth $500. Code section 61(a)(3) tells us
that gain from such an exchange is included in gross income and section 1001 tells us that we measure that gain by deducting our basis
125
from our amount realized 124 and that we must recognize that gain.
There is absolutely no problem with our saying in very precise terms
exactly what the tax treatment of that exchange of property should be.
"cases," are still proof of law's determinacy. "[T]he reason that easiest cases are not 'cases' at all
is that law's relative determinacy does not permit us to make a 'case' out of them." Solum, supra
note 30, at 495.
121. By the same token, though the tax treatment of an inter vivos gift may offer some
evidence of the determinacy or indeterminacy of the gift tax, it is only very general proof of the
determinacy or indeterminacy of the income tax. It should be apparent that I approach this
matter from the perspective that tax indeterminacy may be greater or less than other areas of
legal indeterminacy. That is not the approach of others who are writing about legal
indeterminacy. Generally, they seem to extend their views of legal indeterminacy (or
determinacy) to all areas of law with equal conviction. I do not fully agree with them on this
point. Moreover, I am distrustful of being any more general than my immediate topic requires.
Thus, though I am aware that much of my discussion has general application to the topic of legal
indeterminacy, I am unwilling to press that point. It seems to me that I am being far too general
in my remarks as it is.
122. Our casebooks are full of problems to which there is only one right answer. This is not
to suggest that casebook authors do not sometimes deliberately offer problems designed to
illustrate the law's uncertainty. The norm, however, is to use examples which one of my former
professors called "baby problems." Such problems are deliberately structured to lead the student
to the correct answer in order to illustrate the workings of a provision or set of provisions. Often
several variations on the basic fact pattern will be offered in order to show how the law treats
similar but different circumstances. A superior example of such a casebook is also the most
popular basic income tax casebook in use. See JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (7th ed. 1991).
123. Generally, one's basis in a purchased asset is one's cost. I.R.C. § 1012 (West 1992). If
one receives property from another as an inter vivos gift, the donee usually takes the donor's
basis. Id. § 1015(a). For purposes of measuring a loss on a subsequent sale by the donee, the
donee will use the lesser of the donor's basis or the date of gift fair market value of the property.
Id. Property received by bequest or inheritance from a decedent has a date of death fair market
value basis. Id. § 1014(a).
124. "Amount realized" is defined by the Code to mean "the sum of any money received plus
the fair market value of the property (other than money) received." Id. § 1001(b).
125. There may be a characterization question as well. For the moment, I will disregard it.
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Right? Wrong, says the indeterminist. In the second week of teaching
Tax I, we may tell our students that the right answer is that the taxpayer must report $400 of gross income, but in the thirteenth week of
the course we may use the same example to illustrate the non-recognition consequences of a like kind exchange under section 1031 or a
transfer incident to a divorce under section 1041. All we need do is
select our facts according to our pedagogical objective. The obvious
riposte is to assert that they really are not the same case. But the
indeterminist would simply reply,
Of course they aren't the same case because two cases are never precisely alike. That is one reason why law is indeterminate. In a world of
infinite variety, no law can specify a single right outcome to any given
case because no future case is an exact match for the lawmaker's paradigm case.
The extreme indeterminacy advocate contends that the ability to
select facts, to choose the law, to interpret the law, or to argue policy
in any given case is always sufficient to allow the judge to arrive at an
outcome favorable to any party he chooses and still decide the case
within the confines of the law. 126 In short, there are no "easy"
cases.127 If the law does not constrain the judge's decision, if there are
no easy cases, then the law is indeterminate.
In tax, we might respond that the Treasury regulations contain
thousands of "examples" designed to show us the "right" answer in a
wide range of tax cases. Are not all, or at least most, of those examples easy cases? The radical indeterminist says they are not because
they are not real cases. Instead they are tautologies. 128 The facts in
those examples are constructed and stated in such a manner that the
answer is usually foreordained. 2 9 Like the earlier example of an
exchange of property with a basis of $100 for property worth $500, the
facts are stated in a very selective manner to achieve their heuristic
purpose. Thus, even if the facts in a "real" case duplicate the facts set
out in one of these teaching aids, the real case will also include other
facts that distinguish it from the hypothetical one. This means that
even if Treasury regulation examples offer "right" answers, they still
do not represent easy cases because they are not cases at all. They are
126. D'Amato, supra note 2, at 156.
127. Id. at 161-71; see also Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstru:tion:The "Easy Case" of
the Underage President, 84 Nw. U. L. Rav. 250 (1989).
128. See D'Amato, supra note 2, at 169.
129. I say "usually" because some of those examples and problems may not lead to a single
answer either through error or design.
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convenient fictions 130 constructed to provide an analogical basis for
predicting the outcome in real cases, but they do not determine outcomes in real cases.13 1 Moreover, even if we could find a case identical
to one described in the regulations, one might still argue that the regulation itself is invalid or inapplicable because of the operation of the
Constitution, a statute, or another regulation.
Despite the indeterminist's skepticism, the easy tax case is not readily dismissed. The empirical data discussed earlier may be seen as evidence of the pervasiveness of easy cases. It will be recalled that one
study indicates that those persons filing income tax returns pay
approximately ninety percent of the income taxes the Service says they
should pay. The easy case also has a common sense appeal. When a
person records his $50,000 salary on line one of his income tax return,
arguably he does so because the law is clear and determinate on the
point that earnings are included in gross income.132 It could be said
that the same is true of interest income,' 3 3 dividends,' 34 and the various other items of gross income listed in section 61135 and that are
required to be recorded on various lines of the tax return. Similarly,
when one who itemizes his deductions lists $8,000 of home mortgage
interest on schedule A, it may be said that he does so because the law
is clear that home mortgage interest is deductible in arriving at taxable
income. 36 The same could be said for the other items normally
deducted by an individual who itemizes his deductions such as state
income and property taxes, 1 37 and charitable contributions. 13 8 The
list could go on and on. In the vast majority of cases, we might say, an
130. I use the term in a broader sense than the meaning usually attributed to the phrase "legal
fiction." I mean simply to say that these hypothetical examples and problems have been reduced
to an essence that describes reality but does not precisely capture it. Thus, they serve as
metaphors not mirrors. This use of the term "fiction" is exemplified by the work of the German
philosopher Hans Vaihinger in his masterwork, The Philosophy of 'As If' (1924). Lon L. Fuller
drew upon this work for his own contribution to our understanding of legal fictions in a series of
articles first published in the early 1930s and later collected. LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS
(1967). Fuller defined the legal fiction as a false assumption deemed to be true for a limited
purpose in the law. Id. at 7-10. Like Vaihinger, he considered the legal fiction to be an
analogical device. For a detailed treatment of Fuller's work and the use of the legal fiction in tax
law, see John A. Miller, LiarsShould Have Good Memories: Legal Fictionsand the Tax Code, 64
U. COLO. L. REv. (forthcoming 1993).
131. See D'Amato, supra note 2, at 182.
132. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(l) (West 1992).
133. Id. § 61(a)(4).
134. Id. § 61(a)(7).
135. Id. § 61.
136. Id. § 163(a); see id. §§ 163(h)(1), (3).
137. Id. § 164.
138. Id. § 170.
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honest, competent person who has kept adequate records will arrive at
the one legally correct result on her tax return. If this is so, then tax
law is determinate in a theoretical sense and, probably,1 3 9 in a practical sense.
The anecdotal or easy case approach to proving law's determinacy
is compelling, but the ingenious proponent of the opposing view can
always suggest a new approach to the facts or the law which might
cast doubt on the validity of the proof offered. 4 ° The element of tautological reasoning in the easy case approach is instantly revealed
when one changes or adds a fact to the facts given. 14 1 For instance,
the $50,000 of compensation may be in the form of corporate stock of
the employer that may or may not be current income depending on
various other facts and on the application of various rules. 14 2 The
$8,000 of home mortgage interest may not be decfuctible because it
derives from a second mortgage that arguably causes our indebtedness
to exceed the fair market value of our home. 1 43 Thus, though the
prevalence of the easy case seems intuitively obvious, it is difficult to
actually describe even a single irrefutably easy case. 1" I confess that
in my own experience as a practitioner, I can recall no easy cases. 145 1
can recall cases not worth litigating, but that is another matter. I tend
to the view that if you add a few zeros to the amount in controversy
139. Assuming most taxpayers are honest, competent and keep adequate records.
140. As an example, see infra note 286 (discussing Greenawalt's game analogy).
141. Solum argues that the fact that indeterminists are obliged to change the facts in order to
convert an apparently easy case into a hard one is itself proof of the existence of easy cases.
Solum, supra note 30, at 472.
142. See I.R.C. § 83 (West 1992).
143. See id. § 163(h)(3)(C).
144. Certainly D'Amato would urge this. See D'Amato, supra note 2, at 156.
145. I speak here of cases I encountered in my role as a litigator. Thus, those cases arguably
were self-selecting as hard cases. Perhaps if they had been easy, I would never have seen them. I
did encounter a case once which I would have thought easy had I not been shown otherwise by
an intransigent judge. It was a state sales tax case involving sales of home delivered pizzas. The
taxability of those sales depended upon whether or not pizzas were "meals" within the meaning
of the taxing statute. If the pizzas were meals they were subject to sales tax. If the pizzas were
not meals, they were not subject to sales tax. I came in on the case on the side of the taxing
authority when it reached the state court of appeals. It had been tried before the state tax board
where a very skimpy record was made. The tax board ruled pizzas were meals. The first appeal
was to a state circuit court where the judge reversed on the authority of a 1943 California case
holding that hamburgers were not meals. At the court of appeals, I argued that the court should
take judicial notice of the fact that pizzas were composed of all the basic food groups and of the
fact that people treat pizzas as meals. The court accepted this argument and reinstated the tax
board's decision. The state supreme court declined to hear the case. Thus, an apparently simple,
and, I would have thought, obvious case was litigated at four levels of adjudication with one of
those tribunals adopting a position contrary to what I would have thought plausible. Was this
nevertheless an easy case? For the reader who is inclined to think I have made this up, see
Department of Revenue v. To Your Door Pizza, Inc., 670 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
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even an apparently easy case will become a hard one. However, such a
transformation may be more the product of practical, rather than theoretical, indeterminacy.
It has been argued that a further proof of the preponderance of easy
cases is illustrated by the lawyer acting as a planner.' 4 6 This is an
example close to a tax practitioner's heart. When we draw up a Qualified Terminal Interest Property (QTIP) trust provision for a will
designed to meet the requirements of the estate tax marital deduction, 147 an agreement for a tax free incorporation under section 351, or
a partnership agreement with special allocations intended to pass section 704(b) muster, we are treating the law as though it is determinate.
At least some of us may feel reasonably certain that the QTIP we have
drawn will entitle our client's estate to the marital deduction if the
executor so elects. We may be confident that the incorporation as we
have planned it will not result in gain recognition for our client, and
that the special allocations of the partnership have "substantial economic effect." It would be difficult, however, for any of us to absolutely guarantee that nothing will go awry. After all, even if the
present law is clear, the Service could issue new regulations and give
them retroactive effect.' 4 8 To the extent we rely on past cases we run
the risk of a court overruling past precedents. Additionally, some crucial fact may have been omitted or misrepresented to us by our client. 14 9 Moreover, there are various judicial doctrines, code provisions,
and administrative policies with wide ranging applications that might
be brought to bear at some future date even though at present it does
not appear they apply.' 5 °
In the end, the easy case is persuasive but equivocal proof of tax
law's determinacy. On the one hand, we may argue that common
146. Schauer, supra note 116, at 412-13.
147. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (West 1992).
148. Section 7805(b) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations having
retroactive effect. Congress is not above retroactive hanky panky either as witnessed by the
retroactive repeal of § 2036(c) and the first generation skipping transfer tax. See I.R.C § 2036(c)
(West 1992) (repealed 1990). The retroactive repeal of a statute can act to penalize the good
planner and his client while those persons who disregarded or were ignorant of the law go
merrily along.
149. Maybe, for instance, the QTIP client is not really married to the person named as the life
beneficiary of the trust. Of course, part of what the planner does is attempt to verify all the
relevant facts. Moreover, factual uncertainty may not be considered by some as proof of law's
theoretical indeterminacy. See Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 42-45.
150. I am thinking here of such things as the assignment of income doctrine, the step
transaction doctrine and other substance over form doctrines, Code section 482 and other antiabuse provisions. See Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MIcH.
L. REv. 365, 384-431 (1988).
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sense dictates that easy cases must be possible and that the empirical
evidence indicates they are prevalent. We might well say of the indeterminist that there are "none so blind as those who will not see." On
the other hand, it is difficult to describe an easy case insuch a way that
it cannot be turned into a hard case by some slight twist of the facts.
So for the time being, it is appropriate to withhold judgment while we
consider some of the "proofs" that have been offered of law's indeterminacy. In considering those proofs it will be useful to illustrate them
with examples drawn from the tax context.
C. Problems with Language
L

The Indeterminacy of Language

The difficulty of understanding rules simply by reference to the dictionary meanings of words employed within them has several aspects.
One of those aspects is the indeterminacy of language itself. D'Amato
argues that words are without clearly defined and g3enerally accepted
core meanings, and that as a consequence the application of a rule of
law to any given case is always uncertain. 151 In contrast, Greenawalt
suggests that "shared understandings" of rules ordinarily constrain
the decisions of judges"5 2 and that the same principle applies to the
meanings of words.153 Schauer argues that "some number of linguistic
conventions, or rules of language, are known and shared by all people
15 4
having competence in the English language."
That language communicates something is an inescapable conclusion. Even without the benefit of a particular context or the benefit of
knowing the identity of the speaker, we gain more meaning from a
sentence spoken in English than we would from a series of wordless
sounds. Though the meaning of any given word may change over
time, still at any given moment in time any word will have some meaning that is widely accepted as inherent in that word.1 55 How much
acontextual meaning words carry is difficult to say. However, when
we add a compensating context to a word, phrase, or sentence, the
amount of meaning communicated increases. The extent to which the
151. D'Amato, supra note 2, at 162, 171-79.
152. Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 49-50.
153. Id. Elsewhere he says "lest we be overcome by skepticism, we need to revert to the idea
that language is communal, that those who share a common langua.ge and culture will often
understand that the meaning of sentences in context includes some thu'igs and excludes others."
Id. at 66-67.
154. Schaner, supra note 1, at 526.
155. Schauer discusses this matter at some length, but I will not recapitulate his arguments
here. But if you are inclined to doubt my modest claims about the ability of language to convey
shared meaning, see id. at 520-29.
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meaning communicated is the same for all hearers is subject to question. Thus, for instance, the sentence "gross income means all income
from whatever source derived" would mean something to any person
fluent in English, but it would mean more if he knew that the sentence
was part of the income tax code. Whether he would understand by
that sentence in that context that gains from sales of property are
includable in gross income might remain in doubt. On the other hand,
if our hearer is a tax lawyer we would certainly expect him to know
that gains from sales of property constitute gross income. Thus, a
sense of context when combined with shared understanding leads to
more definitely accepted meanings.
Although language communicates meaning, it often does so in such
a way as to leave room for disagreement about what is communicated.
A longstanding example of the phenomena of indeterminacy in tax
legalese is the phrase in section 162 limiting business expense deductions to "ordinary and necessary" expenses.15 6 After more than half a
century, Welch v. Helvering remains the most important general explication of the meaning of the word "ordinary." There the Supreme
Court wrote:
Here, indeed, as so often in other branches of law, the decisive distinctions are those of degree and not of kind. One struggles in vain for any
verbal formula that will supply a ready touchstone. The standardset up
by the statute is not a rule of law; it is rathera way of life. Life in all its
fullness must supply the answer to the riddle.5' 7
Here we have explicit recognition of the uncertain meaning of a key
statutory word. Indeed, the Court went even further by acknowledging that the apparent rule was no rule at all in the deterministic sense.
In saying that "life in all its fullness must supply the answer" the
Court was, in effect, conceding the contextual, perceptual and judg156. The word "expense" is itself ambiguous. In particular, drawing the line between
expenses and capital expenditures is often a subject of some controversy. See BORIS I. BITTKER
& MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS

10.6 (1988).

See also DODGE, supra note 41, at 164-65. Moreover, § 162 also provides that salary expenses
must be "reasonable," another word of uncertain meaning. See, eg., Harolds Club v.
Commissioner, 340 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1965). A further point of confusion in § 162 lies in its
allowance for deduction of travelling expenses while away from "home" on business. The
meaning of "home" is a matter of debate. Some courts, applying the plain meaning rule, assert
that home refers to the taxpayer's principal residence. See, eg., Rosenspan v. United States, 438
F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971). The Service contends that "home" means
the taxpayer's principal place of business. See Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 C.B. 60. More recently,
the Service has argued that a taxpayer may have more than one tax home at the same time. At
least one court has interpreted the use of the word "home" in § 162 to mean that a taxpayer can
have only one tax home at a time. See Andrews v. Commissioner, 931 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1991).
157. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933) (emphasis added).
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mental qualities inherent in applying rules to reality. But, granting the
initial indeterminacy of the word "ordinary," can we not say that over
the years the cases and regulations interpreting that word have fleshed
out its meaning in the tax context?1 58 Perhaps more importantly, can
we not say that there are many specific expenses we can imagine which
are indisputably "ordinary?" For instance, can we not now say with
certainty that the purchase of pencils and paper by an accounting firm
for use in its business is an "ordinary" business expense under any
1 59
plausible definition of the word?
There is another point we might make in favor of the definiteness of
16
tax language. We might contend that the tax world is its own place 1
with its own "communal understandings." Unlike the words "ordinary and necessary," many of the words and phrases we use and the
concepts we embrace have little in the way of everyday usage. This
may mean that these bits of arcane phraseology have more definite and
discrete tax meanings by virtue of containing fewer inherent and
inherited meanings. The probity of this argument is difficult to gauge.
Phrases such as "capital asset" or "depreciation recapture" have
rather definite meanings in the world of tax. But this does not establish that we all understand those words to mean the same thing in all
16 1
contexts; misunderstandings and disagreements will still occur.
158. The § 162 regulations in my 1992 CCH edition of the income tax regulations run over 22
pages. CCH INCOME TAX REGULATIONS § 162 (1991). Of course not all of those regulations
are concerned solely with defining the words "ordinary and necessary."
159. Greenawalt says that even a document using very broad language, such as the
Constitution, gives determinate answers to specific questions such as whether an eighteen year
old English rock star can permissibly serve as President of the United States. Greenawalt, supra
note 3, at 70. Greenawalt says:
[TJhe same legal standard may function in at least five ways: providing a determinate answer
to certain legal questions, providing the basis for interpretation and application in borderline
instances, contributing to a more general view of a document or legal system that influences
legal judgments outside the sphere of the standard's own arguable coverage, contributing to
an understanding of the society in which we live, and serving as one of many guides to
citizens' treatment of their fellows.
Id. The point made in the text is analogous. Even a vaguely wordec statute may provide an
answer to a specific question that is aimed at the statute's middle ground meaning. In short, in
deciding whether and to what extent a statute offers determinate legal answers, one must consider the possible range of questions.
160. This brings to mind the words spoken by Satan in ParadiseLqst:
The mind is its own place, and
in itself
Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell
of Heav'n.
JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 13 (Merrit Y. Hughes ed., Macmillan Publishing 1962) (1674).
161. Professor Lawrence Zelenak suggests that we should be more receptive to lion-literal
interpretations in areas of tax law where the persons most interested in the subject matter of the
statute are tax specialists rather than the general public. Lawrence 7Zelenak, Thinking About
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When we have positive economic incentives for reading rules differently, it is likely we will seek out those different readings.
2.

Language and the Form-SubstanceDichotomy

One reason language seems indefinite is that the transactions it
describes are indefinite. To return to the estate tax for a somewhat
extended illustration, consider the use of a recapitalization 162 to effectuate an estate freeze prior to the enactment of short-lived 163 section
2036(c) and new chapter 14. The typical estate freeze recapitalization
worked something like this: A closely held corporation with only one
existing class of stock might reshuffle its capital structure by the issuance of two new classes in substitution for the preexisting stock. The
new classes of stock consist of one class of preferred stock and one
class of common stock. The preferred stock has a liquidation preference equal to the current fair market value of the business. Thus, if
the business were liquidated tomorrow, the preferred shareholders
would take everything and the common shareholders would take nothing. The preferred shares also have a dividend preference equal to the
current income stream of the business. Thus, the common shareholders will derive no economic benefit from the business either currently
or in the future unless the business grows. This type of recapitalization could "freeze" the value of the taxable estate of a taxpayer
because the taxpayer would keep the preferred stock but give away the
common stock. 164 If the business appreciated in value, that appreciation was reflected in the value of the common stock rather than the
preferred. This device was popular for several reasons. First, it
allowed the taxpayer to avoid some of the estate tax consequences of
his wealth while retaining control of and the income from his business.
Second, it encouraged the recipients of the common stock, often the
taxpayer's children, to take an active interest in the business so as to
NonliteralInterpretationsof the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. RaV. 623, 664-65 (1986). If
this is so, then our arcane words may actually be less certain of meaning than more ordinary
phrases.
162. "Recapitalization" is a fairly arcane sort of word that we might expect to be well
understood in the world of business and law. Yet when the Supreme Court was confronted with
the question of what constitutes a recapitalization, the best it could offer was the pleasantly
obscure definition, a "reshuffling of a capital structure within the framework of an existing
corporation." Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202 (1942).
163. Perhaps I should call it "no-lived" because it was repealed retroactively to the date of its
enactment. See Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11601, 104 Stat.
1388-400 (striking out former 26 U.S.C. § 2036(c) and redesignating subsection (d) as (c)). This
is an illustration of tax indeterminacy at its most ebullient.
164. The gift of the common stock would be currently taxable, but arguably the common
stock has little present value. Thus, the gift would generate little or no gift tax liability.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 68:1, 1993

enhance the value of their growth interest. Third, the transfer of the
common stock at a point in time when it had little current
value
1 65
served to minimize the gift tax consequences of the gift.
The Service sought to attack such recapitalizations by contending
that section 2036(a) applied to them. 16 6 In general, that section draws
into the gross estate property given away during life when the grantor
has retained a beneficial life interest in the gifted property. Section
2036(a) provides in pertinent part:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property ... of
which the decedent has at any time made a [gratuitous] transfer...
under which he has retained for his life.., the possession or enjoyment
of, or the right to the income from, the property .... 167
A recapitalization like the one just described in which a person gives
away common stock while retaining preferred stock has a certain
resemblance to a gift of a remainder while retaining a life estate. In
particular, one might say that although both classes of stock are technically present interests in property, in reality the common stock has
only a future value that is directly tied to the same enterprise as is
represented by the preferred stock.1 68 However, the Service's litigative
efforts to curb the estate freeze failed because the tax court judged that
the resemblance between an estate freeze and a transfer of a remainder
while retaining a life estate was insufficient to come within the terms of
section 2036(a).1 69 In the court's view, the common stock was freestanding property in which the donor retained no interest. 170 Who
was right, the court or the Service? In retrospect we might all wish
the Service had prevailed so that we might have been spared the legislative boondoggle that ensued.
In a sense, the debate between the Service and the court dissolved
into the question of whether the transaction should be characterized
according to its form or its substance. In form two distinct present
interests are created in an estate freeze while in substance it may
appear that a division between present and futare interests has
occurred. The form versus substance problem is a recurring issue in
165. For a brief discussion of the nature of an estate freeze and for citations to more detailed
treatments, see RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION
4.0819][b] (6th ed. 1991).
166. See, e.g., Estate of Boykin v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 345 (1987).
167. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (West 1992).
168. In contradistinction one might point out that unlike the life estate, the preferred stock is
not extinguished by the death of its holder.
169. See Boykin, 53 T.C.M. at 349.
170. Id. at 348-49.
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tax law, and no determinative formula can be stated that accurately
explains in advance when a transaction will be taxed according to its
form and when it will be taxed according to its substance.17 1
Part of the uncertainty of substance over form analysis is the difficulty that arises in distinguishing the form of a transaction from its
substance. 17 2 Sometimes, it seems, the form is the substance. Con73
sider, for example, the case of Estate ofStranahan v. Commissioner.1
There a taxpayer, in need of some income to offset a large interest
deduction, sold future dividends in the amount of $122,820 to his son
for $115,000.174 The "purchase" price was apparently arrived at by
discounting anticipated dividends to their present value. 175 The taxpayer took the position that the sale of future income produced current income under assignment of income principles. 176 The Service
took the position that the payment from the son was merely a loan
secured by the dividends. 177 The tax court sided with the Service in
finding a loan.' 78 According to the tax court, the creation of the
purchase price by discounting the future income to its present worth
was clear evidence that the substance of the transaction was an interest
bearing loan. 179 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing, concluded that the transaction was properly characterized as a sale
because the form of the transaction was a sale and because there was
no evidence to indicate a sham transaction. 180 The court suggested it
was also a sale in substance because the economic risk that no dividends would be paid was now borne by the son. 18 1 Under this analysis
form dictated substance. Suppose that the transaction had been structured as a non-recourse loan by son to father with the future dividends
as the only security against father's default. In such a case the son
171. See Rosenberg, supranote 150, at 417-39 (reviewing many substance versus form cases).
172. Id.; see also Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form andSubstance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI.
L. REV. 859, 879 (1982). For recent analyses of some aspects of the form versus substance issue
in various tax contexts, see Karen B. Brown, Applying CircularReasoningto Linear Transactions:
Substance over Form Theory in U.S. and U.K. Tax Law, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
169 (1992); Robert Thornton Smith, Substance and Form: A Taxpayer's Right to Assert the
Priority of Substance, 44 TAX LAv. 137 (1990); Stephen G. Utz, Partnership Taxation in
Transition:Of Form, Substance, and Economic Risk 43 TAX LAW. 693 (1990).
173. 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
174. Id. at 868.
175. Id. at 869 n.5.
176. Id. at 868. This principle is well established. See Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356
U.S. 260 (1958).
177. Stranahan, 472 F.2d at 869.
178. Id. at 868.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 871.
181. Id. at 869, 871.
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would also bear the risk of loss. Could either the father or the Service
have successfully argued that in substance the transaction was a sale
and should be treated as such for tax purposes? If not, then once again
the form has dictated the substance. But if this were always the case,
there would be no difference between form and substance in all bona
fide transactions; the form-substance dichotomy would be largely
chimerical. 18 2
Even when we can clearly distinguish substance from form, there
remain competing pressures to honor both form and substance.
Arguably, honoring the forms of transactions makes the law more predictable. Predictability is highly prized because it fosters stability and
a sense of security. Not incidentally, it also opens the way for the
planner to work his magic. Thus, on the other hand, it may be argued
that taxing transactions according to their economic substance fosters
fairness, and discourages manipulation of the form to obtain an advantage. Thus, the choice between taxing according to fbrm or according
to substance (if the two are seen as different) is a matter for judgment.
3.

The Use of Highly Specific Language

A determinist might dismiss the foregoing examples by saying that
of course there is some ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in our use
of language but that nearly all such ambiguity can be overcome by the
use of highly specific definitions. However, this seems doubtful since
we can only define words by the use of more words. The more words
we define, the more words we are obliged to define, ad infinitum. In
the end, even with all our specific rules and definitions we may still
find that some uncertainties remain. Another problem that also arises
as our web of meaning becomes more elaborate is the possibility that
we will make a mistake because the rules are so complicated.
Consider, for instance, the regulations interpreting section 704(b).
This subsection of the Code provides that a partner's "distributive
share"' 8 3 of the partnership's income or loss shall be determined in
accordance with "the partner's interest in the partnership."18 4 Implicitly, the provision accepts that generally the partner's share will be
182. Professor Isenbergh argues that "[w]hen we are dealing with statutory terms of art, the
form-substance dichotomy is a false one. 'Substance' can only be derived from forms created by
the statute itself." Isenbergh, supra note 172, at 879. He argues that a very literal approach to
interpretation of taxing statutes is the best policy for courts and taxpayers alike. Id.
183. The term "distributive share" is itself a good example of the confusing use of language
because § 704(b) does not contemplate any actual distribution. Those are addressed elsewhere in
the Code. See WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERS AND
PARTNERSHIPS

10.01 (2d ed. 1990).

184. I.R.C. § 704(b) (1992).
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determined by the partnership agreement.18 5 However, it provides

further that allocations of income or loss (special allocations) under
the agreement that lack "substantial economic effect," will not be
honored. 186 The regulations interpreting this brief provision stretch

on for many pages. Those regulations concerning the meaning of just
87
those three words, "substantial economic effect," are quite intricate. 1
In defining that phrase, the regulations find it necessary to establish in
some detail the primary rules of accounting applicable to partnerships.' 8 8 The object of this intricacy is to force partners to share the
tax attributes of their enterprise in a fashion that accords with their

shares of its economic attributes. 189 In short, the regulations seek to
prevent the transfer of tax attributes between partners when such

transfers have as their sole purpose tax avoidance.' 90 Though the regulations attempt to be very precise in the treatment of various alloca-

tions, including the use of dozens of detailed examples, 19 1 they also
state that they are not conclusive as to a partner's distributive share for
tax purposes because of the potential conflict between the regulations

and other rules and doctrines. 192 Thus, in the end, the regulations
themselves say they may not be determinate. 193 Moreover, where the
194
regulations are most determinate, they are most arbitrary.
Of more importance, perhaps, than the regulations' admitted indeterminacy is the indeterminacy implicit in their complexity. Even if
greater specificity contributes to greater theoretical determinacy, it

185. See id. § 704(a) for an explicit statement of this rule.
186. Id. § 704(b)(2).
187. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1991). For relatively comprehensive discussions of the
§ 704(b) regulations, see Michael J. Close & Dan A. Kusnetz, The Final Section 704(b)
Regulations: Special Allocations Reach New Heights of Complexity, 40 TAX LAw. 307 (1987);
Lawrence Lokken, PartnershipAllocations, 41 TAX. L. Rav. 545 (1986).
188. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv) (1991).
189. McKEE ET AL., supra note 183, 1 10.02[1].
190. The complexity of the regulations stems from the attempt to carry out the policy of
preventing tax avoidance in an economically realistic way without unduly hampering the
flexibility of the partnership as an economic enterprise. Complexity in the tax law might have
been reduced by reducing the complexity of the partnership by, for instance, prohibiting special
allocations in the first place. But this would achieve neutrality through intrusion rather than
through a mirror effect. See Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Special Allocations, 46
TAX L. REV. 1, 11-19, 43 (1990) (advocating abolition of special allocations and instead placing
partnerships on a share system like subchapter S corporations).
191. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5) (1991).
192. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(iii); see Lokken, supra note 187, at 621.
193. Indeed, at least one expert argues that the regulations are most certain when they are
unfair and, where they attempt to be fair, they are vague. See Gergen, supra note 190, at 3
(arguing that special allocations should be abolished).
194. For example, the regulations set up absolute presumptions that are taxpayer favorable
and that tend to undermine the overall intent of § 704(b). See id. at 15-17.
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may simultaneously contribute to greater practical indeterminacy.' 95
Possibly there are some who feel that the section 704(b) regulations
are clear and certain in their application. Certainly, they are very specific in many respects. However, at least one expert has concluded
that "the rules on special allocations do not and cannot fulfill their
intended objective."' 1 96 Moreover, the complexity of these regulations
is such that most nonexperts would find them nearly incomprehensible. 197 Thus, whatever theoretical certainty the regulations may bring
to the law is blunted by the probable inability of most persons (including judges) to apply them accurately. The specificity of the regulations
accentuates these problems in some cases because that specificity is
directly tied to many factual questions and to the need for detailed
records concerning capital accounts' 9 8 and the like. This means even
those who can interpret the rules properly may be hampered by a lack
of information vital to their application, and much of that information
might not have been vital except for the specificity of the regulations
themselves.
When the problems sought to be addressed are as intransigent as
those addressed by section 704(b), it seems that the utility of great
specificity has its limits. Mechanical determinacy is beyond our reach
either because the topic is too slippery or because our rules are too
complicated. In either event, if we are committed to achieving certainty, our final recourse may be the mathematical rule.
4.

The Use of MathematicalLanguage

Mathematical rules abound in tax law. As just implied, they are
often employed even in those lengthy regulations that so characterize
195. Professor Bittker has described this as an enforcement problem. See Boris I. Bittker,
Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 6 (1974).
196. Gergen, supra note 190, at 28.
197. I would include myself in this category for much of each year. I[
do not work with these
regulations with any frequency, but every Spring I teach them. (Are ou laughing at me? Go
ahead.) When I teach them, I usually feel I have a moderate comprehension of them by the time
I finish. Within a couple of months, however, this conviction fades (along with my recollections
of their many details). Concerning the § 704(b) regulations, Professor Lokken concludes: "The
new regulations under section 704(b) are a creation of prodigious complexity . . . . The
complexity ... makes the regulations essentially impenetrable to all but those with the time,
talent, and determination to become thoroughly prepared experts on the subject." Lokken, supra
note 187, at 621. Close and Kusnetz also conclude that the regulations remove § 704(b) "from
the average taxpayer's understanding." Close & Kusnetz, supra note 187, at 336.
198. A partner's capital account reflects his equity interest in the partnership in a way that is
analogous to the way stock reflects a shareholder's equity interest in a corporation. See McKEE
ET AL., supra note 183, 6.05. A partnership may have more than one set of capital account
books because § 704(b) capital accounts may not coincide with its financial accounting books.
Id.
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the elaboration approach to rule making. 199 Usually they operate by

reducing the law to a mathematical limitation such as by setting a
specific dollar limit on a deduction or exclusion or by using a set percentage to a similar end,2" ° but they can function in a wide variety of
contexts. These rules are examples of the subordination of fairness to
certainty and administrative ease.20' For example, consider the mileage rule for determining who is entitled to deduct moving expenses. 20 2
The rule provides that one's new job must be thirty-five miles farther
from one's former place of residence than one's old job in order to take
the deduction.20 3 We can readily imagine circumstances in which an
added twenty miles on one person's commute would render that commute more arduous than the addition of thirty-five miles to another
person's commute. Suppose, for instance, the first person's commute
is through the most heavily travelled portion of Los Angeles County,
while the other person's commute is on a four lane highway in an
uncongested portion of northern Florida. The allowance of a moving
expense deduction to the Florida resident but not to the California
resident seems patently unfair.2 4
The unfairness of mathematical rules is not always so evident, but
their essential feature is the failure to distinguish between individual
circumstances in their application in a way that is more pronounced
than other rules. In short, the mathematical rule is overtly arbitrary.
This overt arbitrariness accounts for its relative determinacy. It also
supports the idea that there is a correlation between arbitrariness and
determinacy. The widespread use of the mathematical rule in tax law
is probably the strongest point in favor of the contention that tax law
is more determinate than law generally.
199. See, ag., the regulations defining material participation for purposes of the passive
activity loss rules; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1) (1991) (500 hours participation during
year constitutes material participation).
200. See, eg., I.R.C. §§ 1, 63(c), 71(f), 79(a)(1), 101(b)(2)(A), 121(b)(1), 152(d),
170(b)(1)(A)-(D), 179(b)(1)-(2), 217(b)(3), 274(n)(1), 469(i)(2)-(3) (West 1992). For a lengthy
list of mathematical rules, see Richard Malamud, Testing the Code, 54 TAx NOTEs 1289 (1992).
201. Surrey & Brannon provide a helpful discussion of the principles involved in choosing to
utilize a mathematical rule. Surrey & Brannon, supra note 20, at 916-19. They explain, in the
context of the standard deduction, that the crude fairness of mathematical rules may cost less
than the added expense associated with finer distinctions. Id.
202. I.R.C. § 217(c)(1) (West 1992).
203. Id.
204. Admittedly, some arguments can be made in support of the rule's fairness. First, we can
say it applies equally to everyone. Second, we can say that the Californian could have planned
her move so as to come within the ambit of the rule, so it was her own choice not to satisfy it.
But in terms of the internal morality of tax law it is unfair because it taxes events that are similar
in substance differently based on a matter of form.
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Arbitrariness, to the extent it achieves determinacy, may be seen to
do so at the sacrifice of legitimacy. According to Singer,
"[i]nstitutions and doctrines are legitimate if they accurately embody
or express the good." ' 5 What does this mean in the context of tax
law? It seems to me that it refers both to the fairness of treating like
cases alike and to the fairness of providing individual justice. Mathematical rules may treat like cases alike but only on the basis of a narrow measure of likeness. For this reason individual fairness may be
significantly lacking under a mathematical rule. Thus, heavy reliance
on mathematical rules is likely to undermine the legitimacy of tax law.
Tax language and, more generally, the English language communicate shared meanings to those of us who employ them. These shared
meanings allow us to employ language to constrain decisionmakers'
choices in tax cases. However, language always poses problems for the
administration of the tax laws no matter how one attempts to use it. If
we use broad terms, the statute is ambiguous on its face. Even if we
use terms of art, they still may contain different nuances of meaning
for different persons. If we use elaborate definitions we can become so
bogged down in detail as to lose all track of where we are going. And,
if we use mathematical rules, we lose ground in the effort to be fair.
As Rosanne Rosannadanna used to say, "it just goes to show if it isn't
one thing it's another. There's always something." How important
this "something" is will vary from case to case. But we may reasonably conclude that at least a significant minority of in determinate cases
are likely to arise in a tax system that eschews comprehensive
arbitrariness.
D. The Role of Judicial Interpretation
Whatever approach we choose toward the drafting of rules, the final
arbiters of their meanings are the judges. Any discussion of the role of
judges in the indeterminacy debate tends to mingle concepts of practical indeterminacy and theoretical indeterminacy. The law may be
practically indeterminate because the judge fails to understand it, or to
apply it correctly, or because the judge misunderstands or deliberately
distorts the facts. The law may be theoretically indeterminate because
it supports more than a single outcome and the judge must choose
between right outcomes.20 6
205. Singer, supra note 30, at 26 n.78.
206. With respect to both practical and theoretical indeterminacy in tax law, a recent
statistical analysis offers some suggestive information. Researchers found by reviewing all
regular tax court decisions for a five year period that seven tax court judges were biased in favor
of taxpayers, nine were biased in favor of the IRS, and six other judges were described as neutral.
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Interacting with the forces of indeterminacy is the interpretive perspective the judge brings to her role.20 7 But just how interpretive perspective effects law's theoretical determinacy is open to debate. It is
tempting to assume that law is more theoretically determinate when
interpreted literally rather than in a purposive fashion. 20 8 This is
because, as discussed later, rules, if they do anything, block out factors
from consideration by the decisionmaker in reaching her decision.
Rules are likely to block out more factors from consideration when
applied literally than when applied so as to effectuate some perceived
or assumed underlying reason for the rule's existence. This is because
any formulation of the rule's purpose is likely to be more general and
less canonical than the rule itself.20 9 However, it is possible to believe
See B. Anthony Billings et al., Are US. Tax CourtDecisions Subject to the Bias of the Judge?, 55
TAX NOTES 1259, 1263-65 (June 1, 1992). The study examined the decisions for the 1980-85
period. It should be added with haste that even those seven judges found to have a pro-taxpayer
bias still decided in the favor of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from forty to fifty-nine per
cent of the time, and only two of the pro-taxpayer judges decided for the IRS less than half the
time. Id. at 1265, tbl. 5. The judges who were deemed neutral decided in the Service's favor
around sixty-five per cent of the time. Id. Judges who were deemed pro-IRS decided in the
Service's favor roughly seventy to seventy-five per cent of the time. Id. Unfortunately, the study
tells us little about why these differences exist. The researchers merely say:
the Tax Court may not be fully accomplishing its function as the unbiased arbiter of the
federal income tax laws. Several factors may account for differences among the judges.
These factors include the background or attitudinal disposition of the judge. In addition,
Tax Court judges are selected from various sources including the IRS and tax practice.
Quite possibly, pro-IRS judges are those selected from within the IRS and pro-taxpayer
judges are those selected from tax practice. We did not, however, test for this possibility
because of incomplete data.
Id. at 1263-64. The existence of the differences described in the article suggests that the tax law
sometimes means different things to different people. Whether those differences of meaning
result from errors or other indicators of practical indeterminacy or from theoretical indeterminacy is not known.
207. A further complexity is the interpretive perspective one may bring to reading the judge's
opinion in the case. For instance, in recent years legal scholars have offered a variety of
perspectives drawn from nonlegal sources for interpreting judicial opinions. See Charles W.
Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining The Assumptions of
InterdisciplinaryScholarship, 41 DUKE L.J. 191, 192-95, 244-71 (1991). Professor Collier
downgrades the importance of this scholarship on the grounds that "[h]umanistic-style
theorizing, which takes judicial opinions as its underlying basis, is... limited by the inherently
modest and rapidly dwindling claims that the work-product of the judiciary can make on our
intellect." Id. at 271. It is not my purpose to go so far afield in search of new and confusing
perspectives because it is my conclusion that they are plentiful enough close at hand.
208. As Solum points out, doctrine could be viewed as determinate while we continue to
argue about whether that determinate doctrine is justified. On the other hand, "if(as is often the
case) the justification for a rule is used to guide its application, indeterminacy ofjustification will
lead to greater indeterminacy of legal outcomes." Solum, supra note 30, at 467.
209. Schauer expresses a similar idea this way: "[t]he language in which a rule is written and
the purpose behind that rule can diverge precisely because that purpose is plastic in a way that
literal language is not." Schauer, supra note 1, at 532. He goes on to argue that the lack of a
single canonical formulation of purpose allows it to be stated at various levels of abstraction that
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in a non-literal interpretive perspective while still holding to the view
that law is largely determinate. In part this is because one's interpretive perspective is intimately connected with one's view of what constitutes law. One may concede that "black letter law" is often
indeterminate and yet argue that law as a whole is predominantly
determinate because there is more to law than written rules. 210 From
this perspective, principles of interpretation and theory are part of the
fabric of law, and when their application yields a single correct legal
outcome the law is determinate.2 1 I A likely indeterminist response to
this contention is to argue that principles of theory and interpretation
are as indeterminate as black letter law, because just like black letter
law, principles of theory and interpretation gain their expression
through language. As already discussed, indeterrdnists believe that
language is indeterminate. 1 2
Belief in law's determinacy need not be based on a narrow or literal
perspective of what constitutes law. A determinist does not necessarily endorse specificity in rule drafting as a primary source of legal
determinacy. Instead, he may argue that a broadly worded rule may
be determinate because of the way in which sound principles of legal
reasoning can require the rule be interpreted in a given context.2 1 3 In
this fashion a determinist reconciles determinacy with fairness while
avoiding arbitrariness.
Contrary to this view, the elaboration approach to tax rule making
seems to accept the indeterminist's view that theory and principles of
interpretation are insufficient to render tax law determinate. But
rather than accepting, therefore, that fair law is inherently indeterminate or that determinate law is inherently arbitrary, the elaboration
approach seeks to escape indeterminacy and unfairness through
greater and greater specificity in the black letter law. This approach to
the drafting of rules seeks to circumvent the entire issue of interpretive
perspective by using specificity to render it irrelevant. 21 4 But interprepermits an infinite regress so that in the end "[tihe view that rules shotLid be interpreted to allow
their purposes to trump their language in fact collapses the distinction between a rule and a
reason, and thus loses the very concept of a rule." Id. at 534.
210. Kress argues that even if black letter law is indeterminate, still the law may be made
determinate by the application of "nonrule standards." Kress, supra note 4, at 320-22.
211. See Barnett, supra note 51, at 619 (describing Ronald M. Dworkin's analysis from The
Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967)).
212. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
213. Both Greenawalt and Kress share this view though they explain their positions
differently. See supra note 159; infra note 226.
214. Another approach might be to mandate a single interpretive perspective, then perhaps
we could make the written words of the law more or less determinate as we choose. Greenawalt
believes that our legal system does impose an interpretational perspective on judges, but he is
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tive perspective is not so easily avoided because even the plainest of
rules must be applied with at least a modest sense of its context and
purpose in order to be applied well. a"' Once this camel has its nose
under the tent there's no telling where it may end up.
Non-literal judicial interpretations are commonplace in the law of
taxation. 1 6 Consider, for instance, the judicial approach to reading
section 368(a)(1)(A). This provision defines what is known to tax lawyers as the "A reorganization" as "a statutory merger or consolidation. '2 17 Classification of the merger of two corporations as an A
reorganization has dramatically different tax consequences from those
that would flow from treating the merger as not constituting an A
reorganization. An A reorganization is largely or totally tax free. A
failed A reorganization is taxed at the corporate and shareholder levels
like a liquidation. 2 18 Through case law it has become well established
that a valid statutory merger is not an A reorganization if the shareholders of the merged corporation do not maintain sufficient "conrather vague as to its terms. Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 83-85. This leaves aside for the
present the question of whether we want the law to be more determinate than it is. We may wish
to embrace indeterminacy as the means to greater justice rather than as an obstacle.
215. This was part of Professor Fuller's response to Professor Hart's distinction between core
meanings and penumbral meanings of words. See Fuller, supra note 29, at 661-69. Hart it will
be recalled contended that "general words" have a "core of settled meaning." Hart, supra note
29, at 607. Such a word "must have some standard instance in which no doubts are felt about its
application." Id. "[B]ut there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are
neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out." Id. To illustrate his ideas, Hart used the
example of a rule which forbids the taking of a "vehicle" into a public park. He asserted that this
rule obviously applied to automobiles, but questioned whether it applied to bicycles and roller
skates. Id. Professor Fuller challenged whether even so simple a rule could be applied in all
cases without some mindfulness of its purpose. He asked,
(w]hat would Professor Hart say if some local patriots wanted to mount on a pedestal in the
park a truck used in World War II, while other citizens, regarding the proposed memorial
as an eyesore, support their stand by the 'no vehicle' rule? Does this truck, in perfect
working order, fall within the core or the penumbra?
Fuller, supra note 29, at 663. Schauer argues that Fuller "fail[s] to distinguish the possibility and
existence of meaning from the best orfullest meaning that might be gleaned from a given communicative context." Schauer, supra note 1, at 526. In other words, Schauer contends that the
truck clearly falls within the core and would be excluded from the park by a literal reading of the
rule. But he recognizes that use of the rule in this fashion may be inappropriate in this context. I
agree with both points and conclude from them that some sort of purposive analysis is always
appropriate in the application of rules.
216. See Zelenak, supra note 161, at 624 (noting that in the preceding four years the U.S.
Supreme Court had decided at least three tax cases by adopting a non-literal interpretation of the
Code). "[T]he Supreme Court has explicitly and repeatedly stated that it is sometimes
appropriate to interpret statutes in a manner inconsistent with their literal language." Id. at 631.
217. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (West 1992).
218. See generally BORIS I. BIT'rKER & JAMES S. EusTiCE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
11.01-11, 14.30-36 (1987).
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tinuity of interest" in the successor enterprise. 21 9 The continuity of
interest requirement is neither expressly nor implicitly a part of the
statutory language. The requirement is a purely judicial creation
which finds its justification in an analysis of the underlying purpose of
the reorganization rules.2 2 0 Thus the rule is given a meaning that has
no apparent basis in the language employed in it. This illustrates that
even the most simple and direct sort of rule may leave room for judicial interpretation in its application. The judge's interpretive approach
can range from a focus on social justice or legislative intent to the most
literal possible interpretation of the statutory language. 22 ' No matter
which approach the judge chooses, she is exercising judgment based
22
on something more than the words of the rule itself.1
The degree of theoretical indeterminacy of any particular rule may
be impacted by the judge's interpretive perspective, but the nature and
direction of that impact is difficult to gauge. One conclusion we can
offer is that the more broadly we conceive the judges interpretive role
in applying the law to a particular case, the less determinate the words
of the statute standing alone become. But whether law itself is rendered more indeterminate is unclear. Moreover, even supposing we
felt that broad interpretive approaches by courts contribute to indeterminacy and should be curtailed, how could this be done? One
approach might be to enact rules of construction such as, "the tax laws
shall be construed with no regard for their underlying purposes."
While there are a great many tax specific rules of construction,2 23 this
particular one seems an unlikely candidate for immortality since it
nearly disavows the goal of fairness.
As noted earlier in this Article, many of the recent tax regulations
seem to be shaped around a fear and distrust of unembellished general
rules and the assumed indeterminacy (or judicial discretion?) they gen219. See, e.g., Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951).
220. Id. at 334.
221. See Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 46-48, 73-75.
222. Even if the judge chooses to be literal in her approach to the statute, has she not chosen
an interpretive perspective? We might also wonder what it really means to have a literal
approach. Some approaches are more literal than others. Professor Zelenak argues that even
when one adopts what he calls a "meaning" standard of statutory construction (i.e. we look to
the statutory language alone for its meaning) as opposed to an "intent" standard, non-literal
interpretations of the Code are still supportable because the language must be understood in
terms of the context in which it appears. "Even under a meaning-oased theory of statutory
interpretation, the context in which the particular words to be interpreted appear may be so
powerful as to indicate that the words must be given a meaning that, taken literally, they will not
bear." Zelenak, supra note 161, at 637.
223. See SUTHERLAND STATUTORY Co NsTRUcTIoN ch. 66 (4th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1Q86).
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erate2 2 4 The question is, can more elaborate and specific provisions
render the law significantly less indeterminate or vulnerable to interpretation? Given that interpretive perspective is difficult to control
and to predict, an optimistic view is not easily sustained. However, as
discussed earlier,2 2 5 it is probably correct to say that elaborate rules
encourage a literal approach to their construction since their complexity implies completeness. Assuming that a literal approach to interpretation can somehow be pressed upon judges, the question then
becomes whether a literal approach to interpreting tax rules is desirable. For my part, I am inclined to think that sometimes a literal
approach is desirable and sometimes it is not. It depends on the case.
Thus, I accept that the black letter rules do not and should not, by
themselves, encapsulate the tax law. Our interpretation of tax rules is
informed by context, by reason, by general principles and by history.
If we want to apply our rules fairly we must allow that the black letter
rules by themselves are often indeterminate even if the law in a
broader sense is not indeterminate.2 2 6 If this is so, then the ruleminded approach to lawmaking embodied in the current tax code and
regulations is destined to fail to achieve its goal of a coordination
Shangri-La 22 7 because no matter how many rules we write we cannot
eliminate the need for human judgment in their application. 2 8
224. See supra part III.C.
225. See supra part III.E.
226. Kress seems not to disagree with this view. He says: "[i]f it were true that law
encompassed only black-letter rules, there might well be radical indeterminacy. The use,
however, of nonrule standards in legal argument substantially reduces indeterminacy." Kress,
supra note 4, at 322. By "nonrule standards" he means legal directives which are cast in forms
that "require discretionary policy judgments in their application." Id. at 308.
227. This view is consonant with Professor Zelenak's conclusions about the matter of nonliteral interpretations of the tax code. He wrote:
The Internal Revenue Code constantly generates problems of nonliteral interpretation, yet
the courts have failed to develop a consistent approach to such problems ....
The signals
from the Supreme Court are hopelessly confused .... [T]here is no formula that will reveal
whether, in a particular case, a court should adopt a literal or a contextual interpretation of
the statute.
Zelenak, supra note 161, at 674-75. He goes on to conclude that non-literal interpretations are
sometimes justified and sometimes not. What to do in any given case is a matter of judgment.
Id. at 675.
228. This is an idea that traces its roots at least as far back as Aristotle. In distinguishing
equity as a kind ofjustice, he said:
[T]he equitable is just, and better than one kind of justice-not better than absolute justice
but better than the error that arises from the absolute statement. And this is the nature of
the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality. In fact this
is the reason why all things are not determined by law, viz. that about some things it is
impossible to lay down a law, so that a decree is needed. For when the thing is indefinite the
rule is also indefinite ....
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E.

StructuralAspects of the Indeterminacy-DeterminacyDichotomy

1.

Tax Law as a Closed and Complete System and the Nature of
Rules

One way to counter some of the doubts concerning tax law's determinacy raised by the discussion of language and interpretive perspective is to assert that rules can function as a closed system. This
connects with a belief, common among tax professionals, that tax law
is more precise than other areas of law. Thus, whether or not we concede that other areas of law suffer from a high degree of indeterminacy, we may still believe that tax law is largely determinate. Surely
those thousands of pages of code sections and regu.ations that we all
study so assiduously must mean something.22 9 In short, we may be
inclined to believe that the fuzziness inherent in other areas of law
results from a lack of effort on the part of those who write and make
those laws or from some fundamental imprecision in the particular
subject area. We may think that tax law by its nature lends itself to
precision23 and that the length and detail of the tax law acts as a
bulwark against indeterminacy.
The short response to such an assertion is to a:gue that just the
opposite is true; the precision of tax law is more chimerical than real.
Although the bottom line is expressed in dollars, the means by which
the bottom line is derived is, like any other area of law, through the
application of rules to actual events. The more rules we have to draw
upon, the more arguments we can construct in favor of one result or
another. 23 1 The more elaborate we make the law, the more opportunities the judge has for finding something in it to support the result he
chooses. Thus, the more law we write, the more indeterminate it
becomes.
ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARsTOTLE 1796 (Princeton

Univ. Press 1984).
229. Tax professionals may be a self-selected group of legal determinists. How could anyone

without a natural bent toward rule mindedness be a tax lawyer?
230. The essential focus of civil tax law, at least, always employs United States currency as its
measuring device. This is a relatively precise concept as compared with, say, the concept of
proximate cause in tort law.
231. See D'Amato, supra note 2, at 177-78. Former Stanford Law School Dean, Bayless
Manning, contrasted the tax code with the United States Constitution and concluded that
although they took opposite approaches to the law-microscopic versus telescopic- they both
achieved the same end: "[p]ervasive ambiguity and unending litigation." Bayless Manning,
Hyperlexis and the Law of Conservation ofAmbiguity: Thoughts on Secton 385, 36 TAX LAW. 9,
12 (1982). Dean Manning's work was brought to my attention by the writing of Gordon D.
Henderson. See Henderson, supra note 19. By "hyperlexis" both Manning and Gordon were
referring to what they perceived as a regrettable tendency to overelaborate the law. See Bayless
Manning, Hyperlexis: Our NationalDisease, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 767 (1977).
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A tax formalist response might be that this argument overlooks that
tax law, unlike other areas of law, is more like a closed, logical, and
complete system of thought. A formalist would argue that the rules
we devise proceed from higher rules in a clear and orderly progression.
Logically, then, the more rules we devise, the more fully determinate
the law becomes as every conceivable combination of relevant circumstances is addressed proceeding from the general to the specific.23 2
For instance, the gratuitous transfer taxes233 may be regarded as a
closed and complete system 234 founded on a limited number of central
principles from which all other rules are derived. 23' Those central
principles might include: all gratuitous transfers of wealth should be
taxed at the same rate no matter the form of the gift, and all property
should be taxed at least once each generation. Of course other principles can be conceived of as well. The estate tax236 may be seen as an
application of those central principles to gratuitous transfers at death.
One rule establishes the paradigm case for the estate tax, that is, property owned at death which the decedent is able to pass on to others is
subject to the estate tax.23 7 Other rules embellish this rule by adding
that property in which the decedent had an interest similar to ownership is also subject to taxation in the decedent's estate as if he had
owned it at death. 238 The regulations flesh out in more detail the sorts
of property interests that are similar enough to ownership to justify
232. Kress suggests that a multiplicity of rules does not necessarily lead to increased conflict
between rules as long as the rules are confined to mutually exclusive areas. Kress, supra note 4,
at 309 n.104. Conversely, he suggests that having fewer rules of broader scope may lead to more
frequent conflicts. Id. at n.105. I should note that Kress does not consider himself a legal
formalist. Instead, he argues for a theory of law that envisions "a middle ground between
formalism and radical indeterminacy." Id at 329. If I take the liberty of describing views
propounded by Kress as being "formalistic," I mean this only in a relative sense, and I do not
intend to use the term pejoratively.
233. I include here the estate tax, the gift tax, and the generation skipping transfer taxes.
234. Schauer distinguishes between closed systems and complete systems by defining a closed
system as one "whose operations require recourse only to the norms of the system and to
accepted linguistic and observational skills." Schauer, supra note 1, at 535. A complete system
addresses all possible questions arising within the system. Id. at 536. A closed and complete
legal system, consequently, is one which is capable of resolving all questions arising within it
solely by reference to the pre-existing rules of that system.
235. There has been a good deal written about making the transfer taxes even more
structurally unified and coherent. See, eg., Harry L. Gutman, A Comment on the ABA Tax
Section Task Force Report on Transfer Tax Restructuritg,41 TAX LAW. 653 (1988); Edward C.
Halbach Jr., An Accessions Tax, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 211 (1988); American Bar
Association Section of Taxation Task Force on Transfer Tax Restructuring, ABA Report on
Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 395 (1988).
236. I.R.C. §§ 2001-2056A (West 1992).
237. See id. § 2033.
238. See id. §§ 2034-44.
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treating the decedent as if he owned the property at death. The result

is a descending spiral of greater and greater specificity until all uncertainty has been removed.
There are a number of objections that can be made to the proposition that tax law represents a closed, logical, and complete system.
The most obvious argument is to contend that possible factual variations are so numerous that the rules cannot anticipate them all.
Therefore, even if the system is closed, it is still incomplete. The
income tax seems particularly susceptible to this objection.23 9
Another line of attack is to assert by analogy to certain mathematical
theorems that tax law and all other systems of rules are inherently
incomplete and subject to self-contradiction. 2" A simple example of
this line of attack is provided by the possibility that the existing rules,
even if they are determinate as presently written, can be revised retro239. See supra note 20.
240. See, eg., John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some Lessons About the Law from Selfreferential Problems in Mathematics, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 992 (19921). Professors Rogers and
Molzon analogize legal systems to axiomatic systems of mathematics and, by extending that
analogy, argue that Kurt Godel's Incompleteness Theorem has implcations for legal systems
similar to its implications for mathematical systems. Id. Godel "proved that if a number theory
system's set of axioms is complex enough to include simple arithmetic, then there are true
statements within the system that cannot be reached using the axioms and rules of the system. In
other words, he proved that such systems have formally undecidable propositions." Id. at 993.
The incompleteness of such systems arises from the capacity for paradox that lies in the capacity
for self-reference. But to understand this statement one must understand the distinction between
formal language and metalanguage. Id. at 994. In the legal context, formal language is made up
of the substantive rules of law and metalanguage is composed of the rules for creating and
changing the formal rules. Id. at 1002. A simple example of the way in which formal language
and metalanguage can operate to confuse even an apparently coherent system is provided by a
hypothetical corporation's articles of incorporation. Suppose that the articles provide that only
approval by two-thirds of the shareholders can authorize an increase in the salaries of the
directors. Suppose further that the articles have provision for their own amendment by approval
of a simple majority of the shareholders. A question that might arise in such circumstances is
whether a simple majority could amend the articles by changing the required shareholder
approval for director's raises from two-thirds to a simple majority. If.,;o, then a simple majority
could approve director's raises despite the rule requiring two-thirds shareholder approval for
such raises by the intermediate step of such amendment. In this example, the interaction
between metalanguage and formal language has undermined the determinacy of the formal
language. But the incompleteness of a legal system capable of self-reFerence goes beyond such
confusions between formal language and metalanguage. It also relates, for example, to problems
of self-reference at the metalanguage level alone. Suppose, for example, Congress were to enact a
new code section and include in it a provision stating that "this section shall not be subject to
congressional amendment." Can the current Congress prohibit statutory enactments by a future
Congress? Put differently, can the metalanguage restrict the metalanguage by self-reference?
The answer cannot be found within the metalanguage itself. But per~aps we can refer to some
higher language (meta-metalanguage?) to resolve our question. The extent of indeterminacy
established by these problems of self-reference is debatable. Rogers and Molzon seem to believe
that these problems do not threaten the overall integrity of the legal system. Id. at 1016-21.
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actively.2 41 Any system of rules that is capable of self-reference is
capable of self-distortion. As already discussed, another way to challenge the closed system theory is to argue that since tax law gains its
expression through language, the meanings of tax rules are inherently
uncertain because words lack clear determinate meanings.2 42 The
related argument, also addressed earlier, is to contend legal indeterminacy arises because people have different perspectives concerning the
degree of latitude the decisionmaker may take in interpreting the
rules.2 43 These last two arguments, as we have seen, present very real
challenges to tax law's determinacy.
From a structural perspective, the problem of completeness is common to all legal systems. Typically this problem is addressed by the
use of deliberate generality in the norms employed. 2 ' The vagueness
of such norms permits interpretation of them by reference to contextual matters occurring outside the legal system. For this reason, the
more vague the norms employed, the less closed the system becomes.
"Thus, legal systems often reject closedness because they must deal
with a large array of problems presented by a complex and fluid
world."24' 5 In tax, this correlates with the social context approach to
rule making which employs broadly worded rules whose precise meaning is worked out in various contexts as cases arise. But, as discussed
earlier, the elaboration approach that now characterizes so many tax
rules rejects vagueness in favor of specificity. 246 Thus, it seeks to
maintain the system as a closed one. It also seeks completeness
through great elaboration. Under this approach completeness arises,
if it arises, through specific anticipation of all possible factual variations of legal consequence prior to their arising.
It seems doubtful that the tax rule makers can, in fact, anticipate the
future as fully as the elaboration approach requires in order to be complete. Many transactions and other events of tax consequence are easily shaped by astute planners. Property can be carved up into many
oddly shaped pieces and then passed from hand to hand in the most
circuitous fashion. 247 The variations seem almost endless. To fairly
address in advance all those variations each with its own specific rule
241. See I.R.C. § 7805(b) (West 1992).
242. See supra part IV.C.
243. See supra part IV.D.
244. Schauer, supra note 1, at 536.
245. Id.
246. See supra part III.C.
247. Consider, for example, estate freezes, those mechanisms for transferring value out of
one's potential estate while avoiding estate and gift taxes. There were over one dozen general
formats for estate freezes and many possible variations within those formats. See Byrle M.
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seems both hopeless and perhaps even ridiculous. But even more
importantly, the effort to achieve completeness through elaborate
specificity misses a major point of having rules in the first place; rules,
if they do anything, cut back on the factors that the decisionmaker is
permitted to consider in rendering a decision.24 8 Rules are supposed
to be arbitrary.
Rules restrict the discretion of the decisionmaker by limiting the
facts she may consider and by delineating her choices of action in any
given case. Thus, there is an element of arbitrariness inherent in the
very concept of a rule. Schauer asserts,
[r]ules block consideration of the full array of reasons that bear upon a
particular decision in two different ways. First, they exclude from consideration reasons that might have been available had the decisionmaker
not been constrained by a rule. Second, the rule itself becomes a reason
for action, or a reason for decision.24 9
If Schauer is correct on these points, then rules work by reducing the
decisionmaker's ability to be completely fair in any given case. By
their very nature rules are incongruent with the apparent goal of specific preplanned fairness adopted by the elaboration approach because
"a rule-bound decisionmaker, precluded from taking into account certain features of the present case, can never do better but can do worse
than a decisionmaker seeking the optimal result for a case through a
0
rule-free decision.

25

It is the inherent insensitivity of rules to factors that might otherwise be relevant in reaching a fair decision that lend them their ruleness, that give them their determinacy. Thus, there is a certain irony
in seeking to escape arbitrariness through ever greater elaboration of
the written rules. Consider this irony in the context of the passive
activity loss rules contained in section 469251 and in its accompanying
regulations. Section 469 divides tax losses into two categories and
treats one of those categories of losses, passive losses, as inferior to the
other.2 5 2 It distinguishes between these two categories on the basis of
a single factor, the degree of participation of the person claiming the
loss in the activity generating the loss. 253 The purpose in drawing this
Abbin, The Value Capping Cafeteria-Selectingthe Appropriate Freeze Technique, 15 U. MIAMI
INST. ON EsT. PLAN. §§ 2000-15 (1981).

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Schauer, supra note 1, at 536.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 542.
I.R.C. § 469 (West 1992).
Id. § 469(a)(1), (c).
Id. § 469(c), (h).
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distinction was to put an end to tax shelters. These shelters were
thought to be generating tax losses that were not real economic losses.
In short, the passive activity loss rules rested on an analogy between
passive losses and unrealized losses. It has been amply demonstrated
by others that, as a whole, the passive loss category is both underinclusive and overinclusive of the types of losses that were the intended
target of the provision."' 4 Nonetheless, that is how the general rule
does its job; it looks at one factor to the exclusion of other factors, and
on the basis of that one factor it makes a determination about how a
particular loss is treated. What could be more arbitrary? Does it
make sense in such a context to write hundreds of pages of additional
rules in an effort to make this arbitrary rule operate fairly? Strangely
enough, the answer is both yes and no.
Just because rules contain an element of inherent arbitrariness does
not mean that some rules are not more fair than others. The rules
expounding upon section 469 can to some extent alleviate or exacerbate the unfairnesses that will come about under the main rule's operation. Thus, exceptions to the main rule2 55 may relieve some of the

unfairness of the main rule by rendering it less overinclusive. But the
distinctions drawn by the subsidiary rules will often have the same
arbitrary quality as the main rule. 25 6 To the extent the modifying
rules are not arbitrary they are likely to be vague, such as by making
reference to some sort of facts and circumstances test.2 57 In this way,

each new rule can introduce new elements into our understanding of
the main rule that make it more fair or less fair, more arbitrary or
more uncertain in its operation. The subsidiary rules can only operate
to counter the arbitrariness of the main rule without loss of overall
determinacy by employing equally arbitrary exceptions. The alternative is to employ exceptions that are more vaguely worded than the
main rule thereby rendering the main rule less certain of meaning and
more open to decisionmaker discretion. No matter how many rules
we write we cannot escape this conundrum of either increasing arbitrariness to maintain determinacy or increasing vagueness to permit
discretion.
254. See, eg., Michael A. Oberst, The Passive Activity Provisions-A Tax Policy Blooper, 40 U.
FLA. L. REv. 641 (1988); Peroni, supra note 66.
255. See. e.g., I.R.C. § 469(i) (West 1992) (limited exception for middle income persons who
own rental real estate).
256. Id. (exception limits losses allowed to $25,000 with a further limit based on income;
exception is only available to owners who "actively participate" and who are not limited
partners; other limitations also apply).
257. See, eg., Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(7) (1991) (material participation determined
by reference to "all the facts and circumstances").
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The essential arbitrariness of rules is what makes, it so tempting to
write more and more of them. Being bright and imaginative beings, it
is only natural that we can see ways in which each new, inherently
arbitrary, rule we write might be embellished upon to render it more
fair. If our only job was to write rules in a single narrow area of tax
law, we could readily spin out our rule-writing task indefinitely as new
permutations and possibilities are made known to us. But if we do
this, what happens when the person who is obliged to apply the rules
is not the one who wrote them? With the increasing complexity of the
rules comes the increasing possibility of mistaken application.
Why do we have rules if they are inherently arbitrary? There are
other values besides fairness important to legal systems. Among those
values is the fostering of predictability and stability."' 8 To see rules in
this light is to recognize that to some extent fairness and certainty in
tax law are antithetical concepts; the presence of one denies space for
the other. The elaboration approach is blind to the intrinsic conflict
between the goals of fairness and certainty. It is also blind to the problem of error that is introduced by elaborate rule systems.
The social context approach, on the other hand, is more accepting
of the conflict between fairness and certainty and seeks a point of balance between these competing values. Under this approach, the rule is
written to permit the decisionmaker some discretion in its application
so that individual cases can be treated fairly while still restricting that
discretion in order to give the public some advance notice of the tax
consequences of their intended actions.
The view of tax as a closed system has a certain emotional appeal
because it offers the hope for coherence and certainty. There is no
doubt that the tax system often pays specific obeisance to the closed
and complete system ideal. For example, the estate and gift taxes are
partially integrated through the adoption of the unified credit2 59 and
the unified rate structure. 260 However, even if we accept that there is a
strong resemblance between those tax schemes and a closed logical
258. Schauer, supra note 1, at 539-40.
259. I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (West 1992). These two provisions allow for a $192,800 credit for
the first $600,000 a person may make. The credit may be used during life or at death but it may
be used only once. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 165, 3.02. The credit, however, does not
apply to the generation skipping transfer tax (GST). But each transferor has a $1,000,000
exemption from the GST. I.R.C. § 2631 (West 1992).
260. See I.R.C. §§ 2001(b)-(c), 2502(a) (1992). The same rate schedule is used for both
taxes. Just as importantly, the tax on each gratuitously transferred piece of property is computed
with reference to all prior gratuitous transfers so that the aggregate tax paid on all gratuitous
transfers will be the same without regard to when the transfers occurred. See STEPHENS ET AL.,
supra note 165, %2.01.
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system, we must admit that ambiguity and uncertainty is a persistent
problem within that system as it interacts with the world of real people
and their property. An obvious problem is that of valuation of property subject to the tax.
2.

The Valuation Problem

The valuation problem is epistemological at its foundation. Though
we may reasonably believe that the external world we call reality truly
exists, we are dependent upon our senses for the proof of this belief.
Thus, the beliefs about reality of any individual are necessarily arrived
at independently from the beliefs about reality of any other individual.
Though we have reason to believe that these independent perceptions
of reality are similar, we also have reason to believe that these perceptions are not identical. Just as an object viewed under different circumstances of light and perspective will appear similar but different to
the same individual, so too may the same object viewed in identical
circumstances by different individuals appear similar but not identical
to those individuals.261 In tax we usually can skirt the subjective
aspects of valuation because the transactions or events at issue may
involve cash or property for which there is an established market. But
often, especially in the context of the transfer taxes, the indeterminate
aspects of value cannot be avoided without resort to arbitrariness.2 62
A fascinating case illustrating some of the inherent problems of
property valuation and displaying some of the tax planner's legerde2 63 In Estate
main is Estate of Harrison.
of Harrison,the tax court was
asked to place a value on a decedent's limited partnership interest. 2 4
The partnership was formed shortly before the decedent's death and
consisted of three partners, the decedent, and his two sons.2 65 The
decedent contributed property worth approximately $60,000,000 (all
of the dollar figures in the case were stipulated) to the partnership and
took back a seventy-seven percent limited partnership interest and a
261. This line of reasoning is described with compelling simplicity in BERTRAND RUSSELL,
THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY (Hackett ed., 1912).

262. We have recently seen a whole new chapter of rules concerning valuation of interests
added to the gratuitous transfer rules. See I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704 (West 1992). It remains to be
seen how much fairness and certainty they will bring to the law. For some preliminary
discussions of these rules and the regulations interpreting them, see Lloyd Leva Plaine & Pam H.
Schneider, Proposed Valuation Regulations Provide Workable Exceptionsfor Transfers in Trust,

75 J. TAX'N 142 (1991); Pam H. Schneider & Lloyd Leva Plaine, Proposed Valuation Regulations
Flesh Out Operation of the Subtraction Method, 75 J. TAX'N 82 (1991).

Any reader who

considers them closely is likely to be struck with how arbitrary they are in their main features.
263. 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306 (1987).
264. Id. at 1307.
265. Id.
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one percent general partnership interest. 266 The two sons each contributed property worth approximately $8,000,0C0 and took back
eleven percent general partnership interests. 267 A crucial fact was that
only general partners had the right to dissolve the partnership.2 63
Moreover, the right to dissolve the partnership terminated with the
general partner's death.2 69 Following the decedent's death, his estate
took the position that the limited partnership interest was worth
$33,000,000.27 ° This sum was approximately $26,500,000 less than
the admitted value of the interest while the decedent was living.2 7 '
The difference in value was attributable to the fact that the limited
partnership interest was no longer coupled with the right to force a
dissolution of the partnership since the decedent's general partnership
interest no longer carried that right. 27 2 Thus, an interest that was
claimed to be worth nearly $60,000,000 the moment before the decedent's death was said to be worth little more than half that figure the
instant after the decedent's death.2 73 The tax court agreed with the
estate because the evidence was uncontroverted that the right to dissolve the partnership was essential to the original value of the limited
partnership interest.274 This is understandable. Having one's assets in
a limited partnership with no right of dissolution is a bit like having
money in a vault for which one lacks the combination. But where did
the $26,000,000 of disappearing value go? It might be thought that it
passed to the sons because the aggregate value of the partnership had
not been altered. However, the Service had stipulated that the values
of the sons' general partnership interests were unchanged, 275 and in a
sense they were. If either of the sons had exercised his right to dissolve the partnership, all he would have been entitled to for his eleven
percent general partnership interest was the $8,000,000 he had originally contributed. But, assuming the sons inherited the father's limited partnership interest, a dissolution would also cause them to
receive $60,000,000 of assets attributable to that interest. The
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1308.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See id. at 1307.
272. Id. at 1308.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1310. In a sense, the court had no choice because the Serice apparently stipulated
that if the dissolution right were disregarded the limited partnership interest was only worth
$33,000,000. Id. at 1309.
275. Id. at 1308-09.
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$26,000,000 had vanished without a trace, and yet it was where it had
always been. z76
Estate of Harrison appears to some extent to have been a case the
Service lost by its stipulations before an unimaginative court. 2 7 7 But it
also illustrates how slippery the question of value can be. Even if the
tax system is viewed as a closed one, there are still gaps in the fences.
3.

The Game Analogy

If the closed system theory of tax is, by itself, inadequate to prove
that tax law is largely determinate, it still contributes to our understanding of how tax law works.2 78 A useful comparison to illustrate
both the strengths and weaknesses of the closed system theory may be
drawn from another area of human activity that is often artificial and
close ended. I speak of the world of games. Consider, for instance,
276. Before attempting to replicate the result in Estate of Harrison, one should review
recently enacted I.R.C. § 2704. This provision is intended to close the door on such results.
277. I once attended a conference at the University of Montana where S. Stacy Eastland, one
of the taxpayer's attorneys in Estate of Harrison, spoke about this case. S. Stacey Eastland,
Address at the 36th Annual University of Montana School of Law Tax Institute (Nov. 12, 1988).
He said that one of the strategies they had employed was to hire all the available reputable
appraisers of the type of property in question before the government could hire them. Id. Thus,
the government may have felt compelled to enter into the stipulations by virtue of being unable
to counter the valuation opinions of the taxpayer's experts.
278. Kress approaches the closed system issue from a different perspective than I have
employed. He argues that the indeterminist view of law as a "patchwork quilt" does not prove
law's indeterminacy. Kress, supra note 4, at 303-05. Kress describes the "patchwork quilt" as
proceeding from the view that "[d]octrinal materials . . . are the contingent and unstable
compromise of ideological struggle among competing social groups and visions." Id. at 303.
Thus, law is incoherent and contradictory because the forces that produce it are in constant
conflict. Kress attempts to deflect this argument for indeterminacy by urging that the
contradictory motives of legal actors are not themselves law, and, consequently, "it is not clear
why law should be inconsistent simply because some of its motivations are." Id. He goes on to
borrow from Ronald Dworkin the view that "legal theory attempts to impose order over
doctrine, not to discover order in the forces that created it." Id. at 304 (citing RONALD M.
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 273 (1986)). In essence, Kress argues that a coherent theory of the
law is possible even if we accept that actual motivations of legal actors are incoherent. Thus, he
concludes that the "patchwork quilt" view of the law does not prove law is indeterminate. Id. at
304-05. This analysis may be seen as failing to offer any compelling reason for caring whether a
coherent legal theory is possible. It also veers dangerously close to the view expressed by Singer
that "[t]heory expresses our values; it does not create or determine them." Singer, supra note 30,
at 60. If theory is an after the fact ideational construct rather than a formative force, what is its
relevance to the legal system? Theory that neither guides nor explains has the appearance of a
useless exercise in sophistry unless we accept Singer's more modest role for theory as simply a
means of expression. See id. at 63. Kress appears to have recognized the potential for this
criticism, because he sought to develop the notion that legal theories can render the law coherent
by disregarding some of its contradictory elements. As an example of this he offers the natural
law theory that "endorses as legal principles those principles that form part of the best
explanation and justification of settled law." Kress, supra note 4, at 305 (citing RONALD M.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIoUsLY 81-130 (1978)).
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that favorite source of analogy, the game of baseball.2 7 9 Though there
may be degrees of "playing baseball" ranging from the sandlot variety
to the major league variety, all those degrees share certain things in
common: players, rules, and a playing field.2 8° Without these things
there is no game. The rules make the game and seem to determine
how it is won or lost. The rules themselves, however, are often indeterminate, though the degree of indeterminacy is difficult to
quantify.2 8 '
For example, let us say that we are playing "official" baseball. This
means we have a regulation size playing field, a written set of rules and
appropriately designated officials to enforce the rules. In such a setting, we are as close to a closed system of rules as any taxing scheme.
Yet consider how many different ways the rules by themselves fail to
be determinative. First, there is the matter of calling the pitches.
Though the rules may define what is a ball and what is a strike, it is
still the role of the umpire to make the calls. His calls depend on his
understanding of the rules and upon his perception of the ball as it
crosses the plate.28 2 Thus, the rules are not determinate of balls and

strikes, the umpire is.283
One might reply that though the umpire calls a pitch a bal, the
pitch.may still be a strike in another, more objective, sense. The
umpire may simply have made the wrong call. This is to say, one may
argue that under the rules there was only one "right" call, but the
umpire simply failed to make it. If there is only one right call, then in
a theoretical sense the rules of the game are determinate even if in a
practical sense they are indeterminate. But though the pitch of the
ball was an objective fact, does the status of that pitch as a ball or a
strike exist independently of the umpire's call?2 84 Could the pitch
have been close enough to the line between ball and strike to have
rightly been called either a ball or a strike? Could the definitions of
279. See, eg., Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773
(1987); Winter, supra note 30.
280. There may, of course, be great variety in the rules and playing fields being utilized and
the degree of sanctity with which the rules are regarded. Mo-eover, without further
specification, those three traits do not distinguish the game of baseball from other games such as
the game of football that also employ players, rules and a playing fielc.
281. Perhaps a radical indeterminist would have no difficulty in classifying the rules of games
as totally indeterminate. But for reasons I discuss later, I do not embrace this view. See infra
notes 286-92 and accompanying text.
282. The rules also depend on his willingness to call the game by the rules.
283. There is another potentially intervening factor, the batter. If h- hits the ball, additional
rules must be applied.
284. For an interesting treatment of the relationship of factual uncertainties and legal
determinacy, see Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 42-45.
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ball and strike be sufficiently broad to allow some pitches to be rightly
called either a ball or a strike?28 5
If we answer "no" to the first question or "yes" to the second or
third, we must concede some degree of theoretical indeterminacy even
in so basic a part of the game as the calling of the pitches. This same
theoretical indeterminacy is apparent throughout the game because
the application of the rules depends on the judgments of the officials.

Was the ball fair or foul? Was the ball caught before it hit the ground?
Was the runner safe or out?
One should be careful not to overstate the degree of indeterminacy
in the rules of games.28 6 Such rules can have a strongly determinate
character as will be discussed in a moment. But at this point I wish to
stress that though the rules may tell us what results flow from a determination of fair or foul, of caught or dropped, or of safe or out, the
judgment of the official always intervenes between the rule and the
outcome. That judgment always depends on the official's understanding of the meaning of the rules and upon her perception of the actual
285. It is widely recognized, I believe, that different umpires have different strike zones.
D'Amato would suggest that different umpires may attribute different core meanings to the word
"strike." Pitchers and batters can probably tolerate this reasonably well as long as each umpire
is consistent in calling the pitches according to his own definition of "strike." Greenawalt, citing
the New York Times, gives anecdotal evidence that the strike zone in the major leagues has
shrunk in recent years. Id. at 25. He uses this as an example of the way that shifts in the
meanings of words over time can alter the effects of rules.
286. Greenawalt resorts to analogy to games to demonstrate that law can be determinate. Id.
at 26-28. His example involves the rule often followed in half-court, informal basketball that a
member of the defensive team must "take the ball back" behind the foul line before going on
offense (i.e., before taking a shot). Id. at 26. He contends that when a defensive player takes a
shot in front of the foul line or from the corner without first taking the ball back, the rule is
clearly determinate. The shot, if successful, will not count. This example is subject to several
objections which I discuss in other contexts. In particular, the example is tautological because
the facts have been arranged to force a single answer. With apologies to those who find sport
analogies tiresome, allow me to elaborate by suggesting some variations on the facts as set out by
Greenawalt. Suppose that player A on the red team rebounds a missed white team shot but
before she can take the ball back player X on the white team steals the ball back. Must X take
the ball back before taking a shot? If A can steal the ball back from X before X shoots, must A
still take the ball back behind the foul line before taking a shot herself?. The answer becomes
more doubtful; the rule is less clear. Or suppose A rebounds a missed shot by white team,
dribbles almost to the free throw line, takes a jump shot, and lands behind the free throw line.
Do we measure whether A was behind the line by reference to where she jumped from, where she
landed, or where she released the shot? Doubtless there are other scenarios one could imagine
where the rules seem indeterminate. This sort of nitpicking does not deflect the main force of
Greenawalt's example because one can still argue that in the great majority of cases the rule is
determinate and that over time additional rules will develop to address all the possible factual
variations that may arise. But when we see how complex the application of even an apparently
simple rule can be, it serves to warn us against casual allegiance to determinism.
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event as well as her willingness to abide by those meanings and
perceptions.28 7
But there is something more deterministic about the rules of games
(and about tax law, by analogy) than thus far admitted. This deterministic aspect of games is that the rules are an inseparableand definitionalpart of the game.2 88 The rules of the game call the game into
being and give it a sense of direction. Some of the rules seem utterly
deterministic, such as those that tell us the proper distances between
the base pads.289 The rules serve to distinguish one game from
another. They are what allow the game to begin and to end. They do
not always determine the outcome but they build a fence around the
potential outcomes by directing the actions of the participants and by
forming the choices from among which the officials may choose.290
Thus, for instance, the baseball rules tell us that the umpire must call
the pitch either a ball or a strike, and the rules tell us the consequence
of each of those calls. The umpire makes the call based on his reading
of the rules and based on his perception of the pitch, but his choices
are limited, 291 and the consequences of his choices are clear. In such
circumstances must not we concede that the rules possess some significant degree of determinacy? I think we must. Indeed, our concession
may be even greater than that described if our particular game
involves few perceptual difficulties.2 92 I also believe that we must concede some significant degree of determinacy for the rules of tax law.
The rules of tax also define the game. They tell us whether we are
dealing with the income tax game or the estate tax game. They tell us
the difference between the two. That difference matters in a very
287. This is true whether or not the rule expressly embraces discretion as a component of the
rule. One might argue that the indeterminacy arising from the umpire's discretion can be
avoided by amending the rule to define "strike" as a pitch that, "in the judgment of the umpire,"
crosses the plate in the strike zone. Thus, the argument would go, whatever call the umpire
makes, it is the rule that determines the outcome because it is the rule that gives the umpire's call
the status of law. However, I believe that such an approach is lacking in depth. Whether or not
the rule expressly countenances the umpire's discretion, that discretion still exists in the same
measure. If discretion equates with indeterminacy, then either versicn of the rule is equally
indeterminate.
288. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV.3, 24-27 (1955).
289. But note the connection between determinacy and arbitrariness.
290. This narrowing of choices has been called "underdeterminacy." See Solum, supra note
30, at 473-76.
291. Even in this simple example I am oversimplifying. The umpire could also call a "balk"
on the pitch, or he could void the pitch on the grounds that time had been called before the pitch,
or he could say the batter "tipped" the ball. Doubtless there are other choices he could make
that one more knowledgeable about baseball than I could point out.
292. Consider the game of chess, for example. Does the judging official of a chess match face
the same problems of perception as a baseball umpire or a tennis linesperson?
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deterministic sense. For instance, after it is determined that we have
$50,000 of taxable income in our possession (perhaps an issue where
the law is indeterminate), the amount of tax we are obliged to pay is
determined quite mechanically by the applicable income tax rate
schedule.2 93 Application of the estate tax rate schedule would produce
a very different and plainly wrong answer. 294 Thus, though we may
say that there is no single right legal answer to the amount of our final
tax liability, we still may say with certainty that the applicable law
makes a difference concerning the outcome and that the difference it
makes is in some respects the only legally correct application of the
law.
The analogy between the rules of games and the rules of tax law
yields mixed results. It serves to remind us of the perceptual and linguistic frailties inherent in any legal system. It also illustrates the
dependency of any legal system on the existence of rules. In short, it
illustrates that there is a dynamic and unyielding tension between
law's determinacy and its indeterminacy. This, in turn, suggests that
there is always some degree of indeterminacy in law that no amount of
specificity can eradicate.
F.

The Predictabilityof the Law

Even a radical indeterminist accepts that there is something predictable about the law.2 95 Law works in society to prevent chaos. The
proof of this is that people believe that law is predictable and act
accordingly. 29 6 But how can it be predictable without being determinate?29 7 One reason for predictability,2 9 8 says the indeterminist, is
293. See I.R.C. § 1 (West 1992).
294. See id. § 2001(c).
295. See D'Amato, supra note 2, at 180. D'Amato calls this the Non-Anarchic Postulate.
Id.; see also Singer, supra note 30, at 19.
296. D'Amato, supra note 2, at 181. "Our evidence for popular belief in judicial
predictability is the care people take to structure their transactions by taking into account the
risk of having them upset by challenges in court. If the risk were wholly unspeciflable, people
would not make plans in light of what courts might decide." Id.
297. Professor Greenawalt, who is certainly not a radical indeterminist, agrees that law can
be predictable without necessarily being determinate. Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 35. However,
Professor Kress appears to consider the predictability of case outcomes as evidence of law's
determinacy. See Kress, supra note 4, at 324-25.
298. There are more ways than one to explain the predictability of legal outcomes without
conceding the determinacy of the legal rules. These explanations relate to the legal culture
judges and lawyers share. For instance, judges may share a common ideology that, if
understood, will make their decisions predictable. In some respects judges are politicians whose
politics are reflected in their decisions. For more on this sort of explanation of legal
predictability, see Singer, supra note 30, at 19-25.
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that outcomes in cases are arrived at by analogy.2 9 9 The determinist

3a°
might argue that this is a back door admission of law's determinacy,
or at the least, that law is only underdeterminate. 30 1 However, the
indeterminist says this is not the case because analogies are indefinite
and open ended.
The analogical function of law is the indeterminist's refuge from the
threat of chaos inherent in the idea of legal indeterminacy.3 °2 Even if
the rules of law do not force a specific outcome in a specific case, they
provide a useful framework by which we arrive at outcomes through
analogy. This analogical function of law is readily discernible with
respect to case law. In deciding whether the ruling in a particular case
is applicable to our case, we compare our facts to the facts of an earlier
case. If the facts are sufficiently similar we judge that the earlier case
establishes a rule of law that is applicable to our case. Thus, to find
the controlling rule of law in our case, we must find the case most
analogically similar to our own. This search inevitably involves the
application of judgment. Moreover, the application of judgment will
also involve some of the factors contributing to indeterminacy already
discussed such as interpretive perspective and the indeterminacy of
language.
A critic of this approach to legal reasoning takes the view that any
theory of legal reasoning must encompass much more than this. Kress
asserts that "any theory of legal reasoning must have a method for
determining which general propositions of law are permissible premises in legal argument and in adjudication."3 3 Moreover, he contends that "a theory of legal reasoning must determine which
299. D'Amato, supranote 2, at 182. According to D'Amato our ability to analogize is "prior
to our ability to learn a language." Id. But if we are applying a sttute or a regulation to a
particular situation, in a sense we must begin with words (i.e., the wc.rds of the statute).
300. Kress points out that there are a variety of other explanations that have been offered to
explain the predictability of legal outcomes in an indeterminate legal system. Kress, supra note
4, at 326-27. These explanations rely on the influence of such factorm as "social context, legal
culture, institutional roles, convention, or the ideology of the decision maker." Id. at 326 (citing
Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1,
21-25 (1984)). In Kress' view these factors inducing predictability may be regarded as elements
of "a richer theory of legal reasoning than formalist doctrinal deduction." Id. at 327. It follows
from this conclusion that these factors are part of the fabric of the law. This means, in turn, that,
if they are determinate of legal outcomes, the law is itself determinate.
301. Solum distinguishes between "indeterminacy" and "underdeterminacy." He uses
indeterminacy to refer to circumstances where the legal rules place no limits on the outcome
("unbound" decisions) and underdeterminacy to refer to circumstances where the rules limit the
possible outcomes but do not force a single result ("rule-guided" decisions). Solum, supra note
30, at 473.
302. D'Amato, supra note 2, at 182-86.
303. Kress, supra note 4, at 320-21.
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inferences from the legitimate premises are authorized." 3" And,
finally, he contends "a theory of legal reasoning must provide for the
prospect of conflicting legal standards."30 5 Thus, in Kress' view the
role of analogy in the operation of law is subordinate to matters of
greater theoretical concern. 0 6
But the indeterminist is not concerned with theory so much as with
practice. In practice, he contends, legal reasoning is based on analogy. 3 0 7 Reasoning by analogy is prevented from being determinate

because such reasoning is inherently judgmental, probabilistic, and
perceptual. 30 To illustrate, case A resulted in outcome X. Case B
resembles case A, thus it should also result in outcome X. But case C
resulted in outcome Y and case B also resembles case C. Perhaps case
B should result in outcome Y rather than outcome X. The answer
depends on which case B most closely resembles on the most legally
relevant and most morally significant facts. 30 9 Determinations of simi304. Id. at 321.
305. Id. Kress has been criticized on the grounds of having failed to provide such principles.
See Robert J. Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalismand the New Fuzziness: The Role of
Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 811, 839-40 (1990).
306. Of course, others have questioned whether legal reasoning consists of anything unique to
the law. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 30, at 65:
When judges decide cases, they should do what we all do when we face a moral decision.
We identify a limited set of alternatives; we predict the most likely consequences of
following different courses of action; we articulate the values that are important in the
context of the decision and the ways in which they conflict with each other; we see what
relevant people (judges, scholars) have said about similar issues; we talk with our friends;
we drink enormous amounts of coffee; we choose what to do. There is nothing mysterious
about any of this.
307. "Reasoning by analogy is said to be the basic way we 'think like a lawyer.'" D'Amato,
supra note 2, at 184 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 86-93

(1990); J. M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1671 (1990)).
308. Id.
309. Kress engages in a much more elaborate discussion of the role of precedent in the
determinacy versus indeterminacy debate. Kress, supra note 4, at 297-301. His analysis, in turn,
initially derives from Karl Llewellyn's work, most notably The BrambleBush. Llewellyn sought
to establish law's indeterminacy by showing that past precedents do not control future cases since
generally there are at least two contradictory precedents that can apply to a given case. KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1960). Kress says that

Llewellyn "understates the apparent power of precedential techniques to generate inconsistent
rules and outcomes." Kress, supra note 4, at 299. Kress then goes on to illustrate that by
reconstructing rules taken from cases into "an entirely novel statement of the rule" we can
generate new outcomes and still lay claim to having followed precedent as long as our
reconstructed rule "justifies the outcome in all the precedent cases." Id. At this point, Kress
seeks to curtail the apparent case for indeterminacy established by his "precedential technique"
analysis by showing that there are significant limits upon the application of precedential
technique. His chief argument for the position that precedential technique does not produce
legal indeterminacy is that both Llewellyn's precedential technique and the reconstructive
technique still must be "restricted to relevant or morally justifiable legal categories." Id. at 301.
The weakness of this position lies in the indeterminate meanings of the words "relevant" and
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larity and dissimilarity call for judgments that most persons might
agree upon but which all persons would never agree upon. Determinations of relevancy and morality raise the same problem.
It may be supposed that our perceptions of similarities are themselves similar but not identical because they are filtered through the
prisms of our own experiences and faculties of perception. Moreover,
our understanding of language is similar but not identical to the
understanding of others. Thus, when we read a statute or listen to a
witness, we understand the words that are read or heard in a similar
but not identical manner. In sum, there is some probability that
another person (the judge) will agree 3 10 with our assessment of the
relative similarities between case B and cases A and C, but there is no
certainty that this will be so. The cases help us frame and argue the
question before the court. They do not decide the outcome, the judge
does. No matter how the judge decides the case, some of us may think
her decision is right and some of us may think her decision is wrong.
So says the indeterminist.
Sometimes we may conclude that no case is sufficiently like our own
to provide clear precedent. Even in this circumstance (perhaps even
especially in this circumstance), a resolution of the case will rest on
analogy. But now the analogy will involve a more consciously
abstract quality because the absence of clear precedent grants us
greater apparent authority to make law rather than find it." 1 This
abstract form of analogy involves seeking the essence of our case.3" 2
"morally justifiable." It is arguable that Kress is seeking to assume away the indeterminacy
inherent in the precedential technique. Certainly this is one argument that D'Amato would
make.
For a detailed treatment of precedent in the constitutional law context, see Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Role ofPrecedent in ConstitutionalDecisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 68 (1991).
310. Or be persuaded to agree. An element of practical indeterminacy inherent in any legal
system is the varying quality of legal advocacy from lawyer to lawyer. For example, in a
complex tax case before a federal district judge not well versed in tax law, the judge is to some
extent at the mercy of the lawyers to present their respective sides of the case adequately. If the
lawyers do a bad job of educating the judge, even a good judge may make a mistake. I think this
problem is especially acute in tax law because there is so little about tax law that is intuitive or
commonsensical.
311. I use the phrase "apparent authority" because an indeterminist would argue that the
judge always makes law. Thus, in indeterminist thought, the judge has equal authority to
achieve justice in all cases. It seems to me, however, that it is when there is no clear precedent
(Who is to judge this? The judge, of course.) that our system mcst clearly accepts as an
unconcealed principle that the judge must make law. In such cases the judge must make law
because she is required to decide the case. Even here, of course, one -mayargue that the judge
must be guided by broad principles of law relating to such things as fairness and equity.
312. Of course, we are always forced to decide the level of abstraction appropriate to the
particular case. Kress alludes to this problem and, citing several autharities, describes it as the
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By thisjp.ean we must find those central facts that somehow show us
what the case is finally about. 3 ' We must do the same thing with the
possible precedent cases. In this way we can arrive through analogy at
a policy decision as to what the law should be in our present case.
This process of concentrating the cases into their essences in order to
reach an ideal abstract analogy is highly judgmental and, thus, it is
highly indeterminate. It is also, quite significantly from a tax perspective, one way in which we apply statutes and regulations to cases.
A statute differs from a rule of law stated in a case in that the rule in
a statute has no overtly recognized specific factual context.3 14 No
matter how specifically the statute is drawn, it is still an abstraction
because it is not situated in a real historical event. But when we apply
the statute to a given case, we necessarily must consider facts in the
case that are not addressed by the statute.3 1 5 Do those facts take us
out of the statute or should we disregard those facts? That is a matter
of judgment. We can arrive at that judgment by reducing the case to
its essence and then comparing that essence to the paradigm case
described in the statute. Thus, in a sense the process of applying statutes to cases is like the process of applying cases to cases when there is
no obvious precedent. The difference is that the statute has already
been subjected to an effort to reduce the law to its abstract essence.
There is another, rather different, way to apply statutes to cases
while still relying upon analogy. In addition to reducing our case to
its essence, we may try to put flesh on the bones of the statute. Resort
to legislative history is a common method of doing this,3 16 especially
in the tax field where statutes change so often and case law develops so
slowly. Often the legislative committee reports tell us what problem
"problem of determining the appropriate level of generality of the ratio decidendi." Kress, supra
note 4, at 299 n.57.
313. I do not mean to say that any one case is only about one thing. A case can address many
issues. Moreover, the essence of a case can change with the context in which it is being
considered.
314. Statutes do have legislative histories, and I discuss that fact below. See infra note 316
and accompanying text. Another distinction that has been drawn between rules found in cases
and rules found in statutes is the lack of a single canonical formulation of rules found in cases.
Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 80. The importance of this distinction for the determinacy debate
depends, it seems to me, upon the degree of sanctity one accords to the literal meaning of the
words employed in the statute. Thus, one who believes statutes should be applied according to
their underlying purposes may feel no more constrained by a statute than by a case rule.
315. The converse may be true as well. The statute may contemplate the existence of facts
not found in our specific case.
316. For a recent analysis and criticism of the use of legislative history in statutory
construction, see W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory
Interpretation Under the Rule ofLaw, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383 (1992) (criticizing the view that law
is legislative intent and arguing against reliance on legislative history to interpret statutes).
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was sought to be addressed by the statute or what policy was sought to
be forwarded. By considering whether our case involves that problem
or policy, we may conclude that either our case is different or like the
paradigm case addressed by the statute.
Another way to put flesh on the bones of a statute is to consider the
cases that antedate it. Any particular statute may be the codification
of the rule of law enunciated in an earlier case.3 17 Or it may overrule a
specific case.318 If we know that this is so, we may be able to get a
better idea of what sort of real world context the statute is intended to
address by examining that earlier case. When this is so we are back to
the process of comparing cases to cases in search of the best analogy.
All of this discussion of the analogical approach to legal reasoning
makes it sound mechanical and perfunctory. In practice it may be
both or neither. It is a mere form. Like a dance, it is best judged in
the context of a performance. Whether we are moved or persuaded is
ultimately determined by the skill and passion of its interpreter. Like
law itself, a legal argument is an imaginative enterprise. Are the
boundaries of human imagination determinate? But, recognizing its
imaginative aspect, the analogical function of the law relied upon by
the indeterminist to explain law's predictability does not fully explain
the role that law plays in shaping decisions and outcomes. This stems
from its failure to adequately capture the artificial and creational
nature of legal schemes.
As noted in the discussion of the game analogy, the enactment of a
law creates something that did not exist before. 3 19 This is true of all
laws, but it is particularly true of tax laws. Many laws may address
some preexisting condition or event within society and may codify
some already existing moral imperative within society. However, tax
laws tend not to fall into that category. For example, the income tax
has no counterpart in reality antedating its enactment in the same
sense that a murder statute may be antedated by the act of killing
someone and the societal disapproval that act may engender. The tax
statute brings the governmental taking into existence, but the murder
statute does not bring the act of killing into existence. But it is true
that the government could seize the property of its c:itizens without the
enactment of an income tax. So the distinction must be conceded as
317. Compare General Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S 200 (1935) with the pre1986 version of I.R.C. § 336.
318. Compare United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962) with I.R.C. § 1041 (West 1992);
compare Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940) with I.R.C. § 109 (West 1992).
319. See Rawls, supra note 288, at 24-29. Rawls calls this "the practice conception" of rules
because "rules are pictured as defining a practice." Id. at 24.
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one of degree rather than of kind. Still, there is something more artificial and, thus, more creational, about an income tax statute than a
murder statute. This stems from the fact that we have less real world
context to bring to our consideration of the tax law and to the relative
lack of moral content in an income tax scheme.3 z°
This creational function of the tax law may not make tax law fully
determinate, but it forces the decision maker along certain lines of
thought. It poses the central questions, and it delineates the possible
range of answers. This is so even if we suppose for the sake of argument that tax law is significantly indeterminate. A belief in the partial
indeterminacy of tax law does not render the Code unnecessary or
irrelevant. Revenues must be raised so that the government may perform its vital and not-so-vital functions. 32 1 The manner in which
those revenues should be raised is not intuitive. Without some form of
statutory guidance any revenue raising scheme would surely be even
more chaotic and unmanageable than the present one. The law builds
fences around possible beginnings and endings. Though the tax law
shadows economic reality, it also creates its own reality, economic and
otherwise.
V. THE PROPER ROLE OF RULES TO ACHIEVE
FAIRNESS AND CERTAINTY
A.

Finding the Point of Balance Between Fairness and Certainty

The tangle of facts, ideas, and theories discussed in part IV does not
lend itself to a single conclusion about the connection between tax
complexity, tax indeterminacy, and tax fairness. On a practical level,
the tax system seems to operate rather determinately. But the precise
connection between the systemic outcomes and the nature of the rules
we adopt is difficult to trace. It appears certain that rules shape the
outcomes, but does it follow that the more rules we have the more
precisely we can shape the outcomes? And, more importantly, does it
follow that we can prescribe by rule that future outcomes are fair? It
320. I hasten to note that I do not contend that an income tax is an amoral law. The basic
justification of enacting an income tax in preference to some other tax such as a sales tax is likely
to have moral dimensions (i.e., the supporters of an income tax are likely to think it fairer than a
sales tax). See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 42, at 35-39. However, if no income tax existed, most of
us would not suggest that the citizenry has a moral obligation to pay an income tax anyway. On
the other hand, if there were no murder statutes on the books, most of us would still contend that
the citizenry has a moral obligation to refrain from killing others.
321. Inscribed over the entrance to the Internal Revenue Service offices in Washington, D.C.
are these words of Justice Holmes: "Taxes are what we pay for a civilized society." See
Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100
(1927). His point is one that, possibly, even a radical indeterminist would not debate.
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often seems that the more determinate rules are, the more prescient we
must be if the rules are going to be fair. As long as predicting the
future remains an art rather than a science, the drafting of rules must
proceed with cautious generality. This injunction gains force when we
consider the practical indeterminacy that great elaborative complexity
may introduce into a legal system.
To the extent any rule is determinate, that determinacy arises from
the way in which the rule restricts our ability to make choices, including fair choices, in individual cases. This means that the aspect of law
that renders it certain is also potentially a bar to individual justice.
For this reason, the simultaneous effort to achieve both fairness and
certainty through great elaboration of the rules of taxation is inherently contradictory. This does not mean that relatively determinate
law cannot be fair, but that fairness cannot be achieved mechanically
through the use of unbending rules. Instead, often fair rules must
leave some room for human judgment in their application.
B.

Legal Realism Revisited

"Let us end all this confusion by adopting a code. Let us once and
for all by statute enact a carefully prepared body of rules sufficiently
complete to settle all future controversies." '22 So begins chapter
XVII of Jerome Frank's Law and the Modern Mind. In the pages
following, Frank gives a historical rundown of the failure of codes to
create clarity and certainty in law. For Frank, the dynamic nature of
human society necessitated a dynamic system of law.323 He believed
code law, like all law, must be "adaptive." 3'24 For this reason he
warned against "the 'technicalism' . . .engendere5 by code-making
[that] creates the false theory that all cases must find their solution in
the literal language of the statutes and rules worked out by analogy
325
therewith.,
For the tax planner, innovation is the watchword. If tax law is to
function fairly by taxing economically similar transactions in a similar
fashion, it must remain adaptive to the planner's innovations. In areas
of commercial activity where the planner is free to invent new transactional devices,
comprehensiveness becomes a futile struggle for foresight. The best that
can be done is a masterful job in providing for last year's deals. How the
322. FRANK, supra note 29, at 186.
323. Id. at 189-91.
324. Id. at 189.
325. Id. at 190-91.

Justifying Simplification in Tax Law
rules might apply to next year's deals can be no more than a guess. Not
even the greatest grand master announces his game plan in advance if
32 6
his opponent retains the ability to improvise.

The desire for legal certainty is understandable, but certainty can
easily become a false shibboleth. Though it has avoided such Holmesian pronouncements as "[c]ertainty generally is illusion, and repose is
not the destiny of man," 3 27 still this Article has noted the improbabil-

ity of obtaining absolute legal certainty through elaboration of rules.
Perhaps the futility of using rules to achieve certainty is as simple as
the recognition that "[u]nderstanding rules requires grasping the distinction between the general and the particular." '2 8 Moreover, even if
absolute certainty were possible, it is not a desirable or necessary element of law. The uncertainty of law is but one aspect of the flexibility
it must possess in order to do justice (and to show mercy?) over a wide
range of circumstances.3 29 As illustrated by mathematical rules, tax
law is most determinate when it is most arbitrary. Though the correlation between determinacy and arbitrariness is not absolute, it is suffi326. Lawrence Lokken, New Rules Bifurcating Contingent Debt-A Good Start, 51 TAx
NoTEs 495, 504 (1991). Professor Lokken describes three approaches to regulation drafting:
"the common law approach," "the rough-cut approach," and the "200 page outpouring." Id.
The common law approach sets forth general principles illustrated by examples and leaves it to
the courts to flesh things out. The rough cut approach is more specific and more arbitrary. The
200-page outpouring prescribes in detail how every conceivable circumstance will be addressed.
In general Professor Lokken appears to prefer the common law approach, though he feels "200
page outpourings have their place. If there are a finite number of cases to which a principle
might apply (or even a finite number of important cases), Treasury has an obligation to say what
the rules are for these cases." Id. With respect to contingent obligations, his specific topic, he
concluded:
[A]s with assignment of income devices 60 and more years ago, innovation is the name of
the game. The law must be flexible enough so that the IRS and the courts can meet
innovation on its own ground. A policy should be set in advance, but the application of the
policy should be as open-ended as the imaginations of investment bankers.
Id.
327. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).
328. Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 647
(1991).
329. Frank believed that the "demand for exactness and predictability in law is incapable of
satisfaction because a greater degree of legal finality is sought than is procurable, desirable or
necessary." FRANK, supra note 29, at 11. He saw the search for certainty as rooted "in a
yearning for something unreal." Id. He described the widespread belief that law can be certain
as the "basic legal myth." Id. at 12. Frank saw the effort to render law "mechanistic" as a
serious error proceeding from belief in the basic legal myth. Id. at 118-19. "Life rebels against
all efforts at legal over-simplification. New cases ever continue to present novel aspects. To do
justice ... abstract preestablished rules have to be adapted and adjusted, the static formulas
made alive." Id. at 120.
However, it must be recognized that if we grant that a legal system must be partly
indeterminate in order to be fair, we expose ourselves to the claim of creating paradox rather
than coherence in our legal theories. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 30, at 44-45.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 68:1, 1993

ciently apparent that we should be cautious in pursuing determinacy
too closely. Uncertainty has its own "repose" that comes of taking a
balanced view of the interaction between law and human judgment.
This repose of uncertainty rests upon a sense of confidence that good
rules applied fairly lead to just results even though we cannot precisely

state where the rules leave off and their application b egins in achieving
those results.
Taking even a moderate view of legal indeterminacy such as that
just expressed, 3 0 we may wonder whether we have :reached a point of
diminishing returns in the tax law. Mathematical rules aside, perhaps
the most deterministic aspect of the present tax law is that its complexity tends to silence debate outside the circle of those elite few who
have some conception of what it says. How can anyone not a partnership tax lawyer herself develop even a modest conception of an area of
law such as that addressed by the section 704(b) regulations? The
answer is that she cannot without an inordinate expenditure of time
and effort. Should we be satisfied to leave these types of matters in the
hands of some high priesthood of tax lawyers? I think not.33 ' If the
operation of law is chiefly analogical, the function of law is still justice.
Justice is an indefinable value that we think we kniow when we see
330. Or we could accept Greenawalt's view that law can be determinate under certain
circumstances. He concluded:
The application or nonapplication of an authoritative rule or broader standard can be
determinate if:
(1) that outcome is indicated by the literal meaning of the standard and no serious reason
for different treatment appears in (a) other relevant authoritative standards, (b) the relevant
purposes of those involved in the system of which the standard is a part, or (c) the
understandings of those who adopted the standard, those who now apply it, or those who
are now subject to it; or
(2) despite the absence of a relevant literal meaning, the import of other standards and/or
the relevant understandings of those involved in the system of which the standard is a part
plainly indicate a result, and no serious relevant reason appears to the contrary.
Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 85-86.
331. This may be considered a matter central to law's internal moral:ty. For instance, Fuller
argued that clarity is an essential element of good law. FULLER, supra note 42, at 39, 43, 63-65.
He also recognized that sometimes clarity can only be attained "at the cost of those systematic
elements in a legal system that shape its rules into a coherent whole ....
Id. at 45. Fuller
concluded that this potential conflict between clarity and comprehensiveness must be resolved
through a balancing of interests. "In every human pursuit we shall always encounter the
problem of balance at some point as we traverse the long road that leads from the abyss of total
failure to the heights of human excellence." Id. at 45-46. Professor Fittker once wrote, "if a
provision of the Code cannot be understood by a good law student with a grounding in taxation,
there should be an irrebuttable presumption that it needs to be re-written." Bittker, supra note
195, at 13.
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it. 332 Too great a specificity in the law obscures the search for justice

by seeming to make the law more deterministic than it is or should
be.333 It encourages a literal approach to judicial decision making that
fosters a greater proliferation of rules to account for the mistakes and
inadequacies such literalism will inevitably engender.33 4
We need to guard against black letter fever. Who has not, on occasion, read an opinion containing words to the effect that "I know that
this result is unfair but the law ties my hands in this matter. ' 335 In
such cases the degree of specificity in the law has convinced the judge
that black letter law rather than human judgment determines the outcome. If we believe that black letter law is not (or should not be)
always so narrowly determinate perhaps we should write the law in a
way that more clearly embraces the view that the object of the process
is the application of judgment to achieve justice. In so doing it seems
likely that the law could be less elaborately written and more generally
accessible. This does not mean that the answer to a given tax question
will become easy because the question may remain theoretically complex. Instead, in such a system the focus is upon achieving balance
332. See Michael S.Moore, A NaturalLaw Theory of Interpretation,58 S.CAL. L. REV.277,
397-98 (1985). I would like to say something about justice that sounds less flippant. However,
that would be another article. Almost at random I recently came across Hans Kelsen's effort to
define justice. One portion in particular caught my eye, though I am at a loss to explain why
unless it is because it is so oblique.
Justice is primarily a possible, but not a necessary, quality of a social order regulating the
mutual relations of men. Only secondarily it is a virtue of man, since a man is just, if his
behavior conforms to the norms of a social order supposed to be just. But what does it
really mean to say that a social order is just? It means that this order regulates the behavior
of men in a way satisfactory to all men, that is to say, so that all men find their happiness in
it. The longing for justice is men's eternal longing for happiness. It is happiness that man
cannot find alone, as an isolated individual, and hence seeks in society. Justice is social
happiness. It is happiness guaranteed by a social order. In this sense Plato, identifying
justice with happiness, maintains that only a just man is happy, and an unjust man unhappy.
The statement that justice is happiness is evidently not a final answer; it is only shifting the
question. For, now, we must ask: What is happiness?
HANS KELSEN, WHAT IS JUSTICE?: JUSTICE, LAW, AND POLITICS IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE

1-2 (1957).
333. Kress points out that arguably "justice not only permits, but indeed requires moderate
indeterminacy" in order to insure the flexibility required to achieve equity in individual cases.
Kress, supra note 4, at 293.
334. See McMahon, supranote 24, at 1447. One may readily decry this mind numbing effect
of complexity. Zelenak argues that complexity may justify non-literal interpretations of the tax
law by adding meaningful context. Zelenak, supra note 161, at 661. If this is so, then in an
exquisite bit of irony the condition that calls into being the need for refined judgment also tends
to preclude its exercise.
335. I encountered a number of cases of this sort while researching an article on the
interaction between state community property law and the federal income tax. See John A.
Miller, FederalIncome Taxation and Community PropertyLaw: The Casefor Divorce, 44 Sw.
L.J. 1087, 1111-15 (1990).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 68:1, 1993

between specificity in the law and the repose of discretion in the
decisionmaker.3 36
C. The Meaning of Law and the Role of Judgment
The extent to which we view the law as indeterminate is often
directly connected to our understanding of what constitutes "the law."
If law includes the social context in which a legal outcome is formed,
it may be viewed as more determinate than if it is viewed as merely the
written rules properly enacted by a legislative body.337 This point may
seem contradictory because one might suppose that the more mechanical we make the law the more determinate it becomes. Indeed much
of the current product of Congress and the Treasury seems based on
this mechanical view of legal determinacy. However, as already discussed, the fallacy in the mechanical approach to making the law
determinate is that the role of human judgment cannot be eliminated.3 38 This is particularly true when we are concerned that the law
should be fair as well as certain. 33 9 The more elaborate the legislative
scheme, the more effort it takes to simply arrive at the point of judgment because the judgment cannot be accurately formed until the
words of the relevant statutes and regulations have been sifted.
Though the process of arriving at the point of judgment may have
been greatly complicated by the rules, it cannot be avoided or forestalled by those rules. Judgment must still be passed. Thus, the elaboration approach to rule making may actually be more indeterminate in
a given case than the social context approach because it arrives at the
point of judgment in a more circuitous fashion. 3 "° The uncertain
336. This approach is consonant with the way in which Frederick Schauer claims our legal
system largely operates. Schauer argues that rules are often determinate of outcomes in specific
cases. This is so because judges treat rules as presumptively controlling. Schauer also asserts
that judges are willing to allow the presumptive control of a rule to be overcome in any particular
case by a showing that a compelling moral, political or social reason justifies another result.
Schauer calls this "presumptive positivism." See Schauer, supra note 2,28, at 665-79.
337. See Kress, supra note 4, at 322-28.
338. See supra part IV.D.
339. I think it is significant that Kress, who contends law is largely determinate, accepts this
view. He says:
Like classical mathematics, law may be ontologically determinate, even if there is no explicit
metatheory that 'tells us precisely' what the law is. Unlike mathematical arguments,
however, legal arguments do require judgment in the assessment of their validity. (Why else
do they call those people in the black robes 'judges'?) The exercise ofjudgment, as Aristotle,
Kant, and Wittgenstein clearly saw, cannot be fully characterized in an explicit
metatheory."
Kress, supra note 4, at 332 (citation ommitted).
340. Kress expresses a similar idea this way:
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effects of elaborate rules warn us to exercise restraint over our ten'34 1
dency to seek "a rule for every conceivable set of circumstances.
An immediate response to the foregoing might be that all the rules
presently on the books were promulgated for some purpose; to criticize the mountain of rules is of no use in deciding which rules to do
away with. This is true. The present day complexity was arrived at
incrementally, and any decrease in complexity would also have to be
achieved incrementally and usually with some care. To arbitrarily
repeal all of the Code after section 1001 would strike no one as reasonable. There is no substitute for good judgment. 342 But that is the
point, is it not? Judgment is needed to decide cases fairly, not rules
alone.34 3 Even cases that are not litigated are decided by judgmentsthe judgments of practitioners, administrators, and taxpayers.
One might argue that a reduction in the specificity of tax rules
would be an invitation to taxpayer abuse. Assuming there is some
truth in this line of reasoning, the solution probably best lies in the
area of sanctions against those who are ultimately found guilty of such
abusive conduct. Rather than making the rules so complicated that
even the honest taxpayer is likely to misapply them, we should keep
At some point, the ability to apply rules must rest on some capacity other than mastering
rules. This ability, which Kant called judgment (mutterwitz-literally, 'motherwit' or
'native smarts'), is a knack for determining whether something falls within the scope of a
rule. Once one recognizes the necessity of this separate faculty of judgment, principles of
theoretical simplicity and elegance provide strong reasons for not positing any rules beyond
[the] first level.
Id. at 333 (citation ommitted).
341. Bittker, supranote 195, at 11. Professor Bittker makes this point while admitting that it
goes against his natural tendencies. He goes on to say, "I regret that the best I can offer by way
of prescription is a more self-conscious recognition of our passion for intricate detail and an
acknowledgement that elaborate formulations are useless if they cannot be effectively enforced."
Id.
342. Smith, in setting forth what he calls "The NonReductionist Alternative" says, "[t]he
nonreductionist position seems much like that of the ethical philosopher who, when asked how
charitable or honest or humble a person should be, always answers: 'Enough, but not too
much.'" Smith, supra note 87, at 86.
343. "For all their necessity, rules are in the end only 'guidelines or rules of thumb,' or
'perspicuous descriptive summaries of good judgments;' they should not be regarded as 'ultimate
authorities against which the correctness of particular decisions is to be assessed.'" Id. at 90
(quoting in part from MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND
ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 299 (1986)); see also Schauer, supra note 328, at

679-83.
344. As Schauer observes, "[t]o the extent that clients follow the opinions or advice of
lawyers, lawyers themselves are part of the lawmaking process." Schauer, supra note 116, at 412
n.38. Similarly, Greenawalt notes that the discretionary non-invocation of legal rules by one
charged with enforcing the rules can be seen as evidence of legal indeterminacy. Greenawalt,
supra note 3, at 51. When an auditor fails to challenge a questionable position taken by a
taxpayer on a return, the auditor has passed a final judgment.
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them more generally worded and then severely sanction the more flagrant abuser. The sanction would oblige those who would like to
avoid the rule to obtain a high degree of certainty that they have done
so before acting against the strictures of the rule.3 45
D.

Conscious Creativity

For me the question of the extent of tax law's determinacy has an
indeterminate answer.3 46 For present purposes it is sufficient to recognize two aspects of law's determinacy. First, to the extent it exists,
legal determinacy often is a function of law's arbitrariness. Second, in
many cases law's determinacy is not fully realized in the words of statutes or regulations by themselves but lies in our ability to interpret
those rules intelligently and with fairness. Thus, a fair tax system is
not necessarily a function of great elaboration of the rules.
What, then, should we be doing with our tax code and regulations if
we want them to be fair and reasonably certain? As should be clear
from what has been said already, there are no formulaic answers. A
beginning point would be to "acknowledge the irreducible variety of
law and the consequent need for practical judgment. '[R]epeated acts
of human judgment at every level of the system... [are an] ineluctable
necessity.' ,,34 If we can acknowledge the essential role of human
judgment in the application of tax laws, we can accept some retreat
from the immense elaboration we now find in the law. We can accept
345. See Schauer, supra note 328, at 693-94. This approach is one already embraced in the
tax law to some extent. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6662-6663 (West 1992).
346. However, I believe that there is at least a significant minority of cases in which tax law is
indeterminate in the broader philosophical sense in which legal indeterminacy was defined at the
beginning of this article. I leave the question open just how much further tax indeterminacy
extends beyond that significant minority. I confess that I am unwilling, and perhaps unable, to
pursue the question any further at this time. I have yet to fully consider many of the other
authorities whose writings bear upon the subject. These works are numerous. For instance,
D'Amato in a single lengthy footnote lists "[t]he philosophical studies that have helped me the
most" in overcoming the view that words have determinate meanings. D'Amato, supranote 2, at
151-53, 153 n.16. Those studies include the works of Jeremy Bentham, John Dewey, William
James, C.S. Pierce, W.V. Quine, Bertrand Russell, Alfred Whitehead, Ludwig Wittgenstein,
John Austin, and Rudolf Carnap, as well as the work of a number of more contemporary
philosophers. In addition, many critical legal scholars have written on topics directly or
indirectly concerned with the indeterminacy debate. See Kress, supra note 4, at 302 n.67, for a
partial list. I hope it will not sound defensive if I add that as one employed to teach tax I am well
occupied maintaining a modicum of competence in that field. Part of my reluctance to take an
absolute position on this issue is that while I believe in the power of reason, I do not trust our use
of reason. Reason is a tool of advocacy, but the objects of advocacy are not always reasonable.
We employ reason to argue for positions we believe in, but the source cf our belief is not always
in reason. The line between dispassionate reason and self-serving rhetoric is not easily drawn.
347. Smith, supra note 87, at 105 (quoting in part from LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE
LAv 39 (1968)).
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the role of litigation in making law. We can accept a structure for tax
law that, while facially more ambiguous, is less prone to the need for
constant tinkering and perpetual regulatory elaboration. In the end
such a system would also be complex, but only because the functions
of tax law are complex and not because we are engaged in a fruitless
search for absolute certainty. We could accept that the practice of tax
law must always entail "a degree of conscious creativity."3'4 8
This view of tax law does not challenge the necessity for an extensive set of tax rules, 349 but it grants the freedom to simplify without
conceding that the law is less fair as a consequence. If the outcomes in
cases will frequently rest on the judgment of a taxpayer, practitioner
or judge, why obscure that fact by burdening the decision maker with
more rules than he can absorb? If analogy is at the core of legal reasoning, should not our focus be the construction of clear and fair paradigms to serve as the objects of analogy?
CONCLUSION
One may be torn between two thoughts when it comes to deciding
the question of the tax law's indeterminacy. On the one hand, it defies
most of our training and undermines our belief in the importance of
law to accept that it may be pervasively indeterminate. Moreover, a
belief in pervasive indeterminacy seems to defy the empirical evidence
and common sense. Surely, if the mind of a human being can comprehend an event, it can make up a rule specifying what legal consequences will flow from that event. Further, most of us have a sense of
the predictability of the law in the areas of tax law in which we are
reasonably expert (though the areas of our expertise may be shrinking
as the law expands). Those of us who have filed out our own tax
return at one time or another could not but have felt a certain, perhaps
fatal, sense of the law's determinacy.
On the other hand, there are many able tax lawyers who labor
under a sense of uncertainty. If we have practiced law, we have seen
the power of reason and rhetoric to shape the law and to change it.
We have felt the confusion that comes with an overabundance of rules.
We have experienced the tendency of legal experts to phrase predictions of legal outcomes in terms of probabilities instead of certainties.
We have seen the role that "interpretation" of facts and language
348. Id. at 108.
349. Schauer has developed the idea that a legal system can exist without rules, but does not
seriously propose that an ideal system should do so. See Schauer, supra note 328, at 651-57,
679-91.
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plays in legal decisionmaking. And I, for one, have seen the moral
and philosophical dead end that an overly devout belief in the determinacy of black letter law can produce in otherwise worthy students of
law.
The indeterminacy debate involves (but is not encapsulated by) a
definitional struggle. Those who find the law determinate sometimes
argue that the indeterminists take too narrow a view of what constitutes "law" and of what constitutes proper "legal reasoning." From
this perspective, law is seen as largely determinate because of the existence of guiding principles extending beyond the admittedly indeterminate black letter law. The indeterminist counterargues that the same
principles that render the black letter law indeterm:nate apply in any
other realm law may occupy. Thus, to the indeterminist, law, no matter how we define it, is indeterminate. The interesting point for present purposes, however, is that not even the determinists seem to
suggest that law can be made simultaneously fair and certain through
mere elaboration of the written rules of law. Indeed, if there is consensus on no other point, there is agreement that the application of law to
life to achieve a just result cannot be satisfied by resort to formulas.
Laws are general; justice is specific. No degree of elaboration in the
written rules of tax law is adequate to fully explain or determine law's
fair operation. For this reason, complex statutes and regulations by
themselves cannot guarantee fairness.
If this is so, then much of modern tax law should be judged to have
failed of its apparent purpose. The challenge, then, is to make tax law
a coherent and rational system that adequately addresses the complex
transactions of the modern world without resort to reductionism. We
can begin by accepting that the artificial complexity of elaborate rules
provides no escape from the real complexities of tax law-the complexities that can only be resolved through the exercise of human
judgment.

